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The Personal Responsibility Pandemic:
Centering Solidarity in Public Health and
Employment Law
Lindsay F. Wiley* and Samuel R. Bagenstos**
INTRODUCTION
Our nation’s response to the coronavirus pandemic has revealed
fundamental flaws in our legal regimes governing both public health and
employment. Public health orders have called on individuals to make
sacrifices to protect society as a whole. Simple fairness dictates that the
burdens should be shared as widely as the benefits. And the case for burdensharing does not rest on fairness alone. Public health measures are more likely
to succeed when those who are subject to them understand them as fair1 and
when their cooperation is supported.2 Predictably, our pandemic response has
placed disproportionate burdens on those who are already disadvantaged due
to economic, racial, gender, disability, immigration, and criminal injustice. 3
Elected officials have asked each of us to take personal responsibility for
weathering this crisis rather than providing community supports and legal
*
Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law and Policy Program, American
University Washington College of Law.
** Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
Julianna St. Onge for able research assistance.
1.
See
BELLAGIO
GRP.,
BELLAGIO
STATEMENT
OF
PRINCIPLES
1,
https://www.unicef.org/avianflu/files/Bellagio_Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DN9-EXZT]
(“Consideration for the interests of the disadvantaged is important for practical as well as ethical
reasons: public health efforts [to respond to a pandemic] are more likely to succeed in an
atmosphere of social solidarity and public trust, including the trust of disadvantaged people.”).
2.
See, e.g., Nancy M. Baum, Peter D. Jacobson & Susan D. Goold, “Listen to the People”:
Public Deliberation About Social Distancing Measures in a Pandemic, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 4, 11
(2009) (“Policy makers must address [economic] concerns to effectively implement and sustain
social distancing measures during a pandemic.”); Amitai Etzioni, Public Health Law: A
Communitarian Perspective, 21 HEALTH AFFS. 102, 104 (2002) (“[U]nfair allocation of [the
burdens of public health policies] would undermine the legitimacy, and hence sustainability, of
[measures to respond to a public health crisis]. . . . [M]uch more discussion is called for about
how to minimize the extra weight that inevitably will fall on some people [as a result of public
health policies that curtail movements, work, and trade] such as how to possibly compensate them
for such burdens if they cannot be avoided . . . .”).
3.
See BELLAGIO GRP., supra note 1 (“Socially and economically disadvantaged groups
and individuals are almost always the worst affected by epidemics.”).
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protections that would cushion the blow, spread the costs more widely, and
enable everyone to abide by and benefit from public health recommendations.
The failed U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic has resulted in
significant part from limitations in the moral vision of our employment and
antidiscrimination laws. Tens of millions of Americans have filed for
unemployment.4 Supplemental benefits have been meager and time-limited. 5
Many low-wage workers—who are disproportionately people of color,
immigrants, and women6—have been exposed to high risk of infection,
blamed for outbreaks, punished for refusing to return to unsafe working
conditions, and framed as separate from “the regular folks” in our
communities.7
This article offers a critique of the U.S. pandemic response as well as
concrete proposals for reform. Normatively, our argument is rooted in a
solidarity-based theory of public health. The essential point of that theory is
this: Infectious disease pandemics are fueled by the connection of people to
one another in society. The same human interconnectedness demands
prevention and response measures grounded in mutual aid. Public health has
been described as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions in which people can be healthy.” 8 The public health ethicists
whose work informs our proposals identify solidarity (interdependence

4.
Scott Horsley, 38.6 Million Have Filed for Unemployment Since March, NPR (May 21,
2020,
8:36
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/05/21/859836248/38-6-million-have-filed-for-unemployment-since-march
[https://perma.cc/K4KZ-5GL2].
5.
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
6.
See MARTHA ROSS & NICOLE BATEMAN, METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, MEET THE LOWWAGE
WORKFORCE
9
(2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/201911_Brookings-Metro_low-wage-workforce_Ross-Bateman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U24P-QQEJ]; Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., ForeignBorn Workers: Labor Force Characteristics—2019, at 1 (May 15, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX5E-Y4AZ].
7.
Meagan Flynn, Wisconsin Chief Justice Sparks Backlash by Saying Covid-19 Outbreak
Is Among Meatpacking Workers, Not ‘The Regular Folks,’ WASH. POST (May 7, 2020, 4:57 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/07/meatpacking-workers-wisconsincoronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/GKS3-8YTP] (describing Wisconsin Chief Judge Patience
Roggensack’s comment during oral argument attributing an outbreak in a rural county to
meatpacking plant workers and distinguishing them from “the regular folks in Brown County”);
see also Sick Staff Fueled Outbreak in Seattle-Area Nursing Homes, CDC Reports, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 18, 2020, 1:02 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/sick-staff-fueledoutbreak-seattle-nursing-homes-cdc-reports-n1163236 [https://perma.cc/FU9W-34E3].
8.
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE
OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1988).
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among individuals and groups),9 mutual aid (reciprocity of support),10 and
communitarianism (connectedness between individuals and their
communities)11 as important foundations for public health theory, science,
practice, and law. Public health emergency prevention and response measures
are meant to benefit society as a whole. The burdens should also be shared.
The coronavirus pandemic, like other public health crises before it, has
demonstrated that the solidarity vision of public health is still largely
aspirational. In the early days of the pandemic, some called it a “great
equalizer.”12 But within a matter of weeks it became clear that the virus
thrived on socioeconomic injustice, ableism, and structural racism. Reports
attributed the first major outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
in the United States at the Life Care Center nursing home in Kirkland,
Washington, to staff members who “worked with symptoms, worked in more
than one facility, and sometimes didn’t know about or follow
recommendations about . . . being careful while in close contact with ill
patients.”13 Commentators noted, however, that nursing home jobs provide
9.
See, e.g., Ryan M. Melnychuk & Nuala P. Kenny, Pandemic Triage: The Ethical
Challenge, 175 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1393, 1394 (2006) (noting that “solidarity (we are all in this
together, and protecting the public and hence ourselves will require society-wide collaborations)”
is highly relevant to pandemic planning); Françoise Baylis, Nuala P. Kenny & Susan Sherwin, A
Relational Account of Public Health Ethics, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 196, 198 (2008) (“[I]ssues of
trust, neighborliness, reciprocity and solidarity must be made central” to public health ethics.);
Angus Dawson & Bruce Jennings, The Place of Solidarity in Public Health Ethics, 34 PUB.
HEALTH REVS. 65, 76–77 (2012) (“[S]olidarity is and ought to be at the heart of ethical thinking
about public health. It does not only come into existence or prove relevant at times of grave
‘threats’ to a nation state, such as when a major pandemic hits the population.”).
10. See, e.g., Bruce Jennings, Relational Liberty Revisited: Membership, Solidarity and a
Public Health Ethics of Place, 8 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 7, 7 (2015) (“[B]oth the practical success
of public health policies and programs and their capacity to gain normative legitimacy and trust
rely on the presence of a cultural sense of obligation and mutual aid in a world of common
vulnerability.”).
11. See, e.g., Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public Health,
15 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 34 (1985) (“By ignoring the communitarian language of public health,
we risk shrinking its claims. We also risk undermining the sense in which health and safety are a
signal commitment of the common life—a central practice by which the body-politic defines
itself and affirms its values.”); Etzioni, supra note 2, at 102.
12. See, e.g., Tim Molloy, Madonna’s COVID-19 Bathtub Message: ‘It’s the Great
Equalizer,’ SPIN (Mar. 22, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.spin.com/2020/03/madonnas-covid-19bathtub-message-its-the-great-equalizer/ [https://perma.cc/H86B-WDE8]; Bethany L. Jones &
Jonathan S. Jones, Gov. Cuomo Is Wrong, Covid-19 Is Anything but an Equalizer, WASH. POST
(Apr. 5, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/05/gov-cuomo-iswrong-covid-19-is-anything-an-equalizer/ [https://perma.cc/4UNP-JXJA].
13. NBC NEWS, supra note 7; see Temet M. McMichael et al., COVID-19 in a Long-Term
Care Facility—King County, Washington, February 27–March 9, 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
339,
339
(2020),
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low wages and don’t offer paid sick leave, encouraging workers—who are
overwhelmingly women of color14—to work two or more jobs and continue
to report for duty even when they’re infected and might spread the virus to
vulnerable residents.15 Outbreaks in other settings—including meat
processing plants, jails, prisons, and detention centers16—similarly
implicated structural racism and weak legal protections for workers and
people living in congregate facilities and government custody. 17 The harm of
these outbreaks fell especially heavily on immigrants and people of color.
Early warnings from experts were rapidly borne out by overwhelming
evidence that Black people, Indigenous people, Latinos, Latinas, and people
with low socioeconomic status were contracting the virus and dying from it
at sharply disproportionate rates.18 A combination of higher levels of workrelated and residential exposure to the virus and higher rates of the chronic
cardiovascular and lung diseases that predispose individuals to severe illness
and death from COVID-19 appeared to be key contributors. 19

https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6912-H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RT3LBR2B].
14. KEZIA SCALES, PHI, IT’S TIME TO CARE: A DETAILED PROFILE OF AMERICA’S DIRECT
CARE WORKFORCE 11–12 (2020), https://phinational.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Its-Timeto-Care-2020-PHI.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QSR-4PZM] (showing that 86% of direct care workers
are women, and 59% of direct care workers are people of color).
15. See NBC NEWS, supra note 7 (referencing Professor Charlene Harrington’s, University
of California, San Francisco School of Nursing, comments on nursing home workers).
16. See, e.g., Michelle A. Waltenburg et al., Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat
and Poultry Processing Facilities―United States, April–May 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
887,
887
(2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6927-H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9GHMQ8G]; Megan Wallace et al., COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities—United
States, February–April 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 587, 587 (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6919e1-H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F99DQ4BA].
17. See, e.g., Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Structural Discrimination in COVID19 Workplace Protections, HEALTHAFFAIRS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (May 29, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200522.280105/full/ [https://perma.cc/DZU87M6W]; Komala Ramachandra, US Meatpacking Workers Face Crisis, Slashed Safety
Protections During Pandemic, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 24, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/24/us-meatpacking-workers-face-crisis-slashed-safetyprotections-during-pandemic# [https://perma.cc/KE46-KELQ]; Donald M. Berwick, Leanne
Gale, Faith Barksdale & Megan Hauptman, Protecting Incarcerated People in the Face of
COVID-19: A Health and Human Rights Perspective, HEALTHAFFAIRS: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(May
1,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200428.846534/full/
[https://perma.cc/D4NE-MUG2].
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.B.
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For centuries, public health advocates have understood that the spread of
infection is affected by the conditions in which people live and work, 20
conditions public health researchers now study as the social determinants of
health.21 But public health efforts to prevent and respond to the coronavirus
pandemic in the United States have largely failed to address the conditions
that influence exposure to infection in the workplace and in the crowded
homes many low-wage workers share with others who are particularly
vulnerable to COVID-19.22 Interventions targeting individuals for behavior
change (wearing face masks, avoiding gatherings, staying home, and seeking
out testing and separating from other household members based on symptoms
or exposure) have taken precedence over social supports (provision of
protective equipment and supplies, paid sick and family leave,
accommodations for people with conditions that make them particularly
vulnerable to severe illness or death, income support, easy access to testing,
and privacy and antidiscrimination protections for those who may test
positive).23 The supports aimed at ensuring the conditions required for
everyone to be able to comply with public health recommendations have been
spotty and inconsistent.24

20. See generally JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
HEALTH (1992). One of us has previously argued that the new public health in some ways
represents a return to the commitments of the nineteenth-century Sanitarians who sought to
improve living and working conditions, particularly for low-wage workers and people living in
poverty. Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 228
(2012); see also Niyi Awofeso, What’s New About the “New Public Health”?, 94 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 705, 708 (2004).
21. See, e.g., Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A
Public Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2011); Michael G. Marmot,
Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED. S9 (2003); COMM’N
ON SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., CLOSING THE GAP IN A GENERATION:
HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (2008),
https://www.who.int/social_determinants/final_report/csdh_finalreport_2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CZB3-KH9U].
22. See Marisol Cuellar Mejia & Paulette Cha, Overcrowded Housing and COVID-19 Risk
Among Essential Workers, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (May 12, 2020),
https://www.ppic.org/blog/overcrowded-housing-and-covid-19-risk-among-essential-workers/
[https://perma.cc/HJ5E-VPLK].
23. Louis Bezich, Americans’ Response to the Coronavirus Provides a Model for Future
Behavior Change, PHILLY VOICE (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.phillyvoice.com/americancoronavirus-response-model-future-behavior-change-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/H8FH-JD6F]
(“[T]he U.S. response to COVID-19, albeit by necessity, is anchored in behavioral change . . . .”).
24. See Emily A. Benfer & Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Justice Strategies To Combat COVID19: Protecting Vulnerable Communities During a Pandemic, HEALTHAFFAIRS: HEALTH AFFS.
BLOG (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200319.757883/full/
[https://perma.cc/AF8X-XFM5].
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Law itself is a social determinant of health. 25 As we show, a large part of
the problem rests in the orientation of employment and antidiscrimination
law toward identifying the fault and responsibility of private actors rather
than serving broader social goals.26
Tension between a sweeping public health agenda that targets
socioeconomic circumstances and a more cramped vision that relies on
personal responsibility predates the coronavirus pandemic. It arises from
competing models of public health problem-solving. 27 “The tension between
these models has shaped responses to earlier threats, including the HIV
pandemic, tobacco- and diet-related illness, and substance abuse.” 28 The
25. See Scott Burris, Ichiro Kawachi & Austin Sarat, Integrating Law and Social
Epidemiology, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 510, 510 (2002) (“[L]aw [should be studied] as a social
factor in epidemiological research . . . . Laws and legal practices contribute to the development,
and influence the stability, of social conditions that have been associated with population health
outcomes[, . . . and] law operates as a pathway along which broader social determinants of health
have an effect . . . .”). Some scholars refer to law as a structural determinant of health. See, e.g.,
Zita Lazzarini, Assessing the Public Health Response During and After the Emergency: Lessons
from the HIV Epidemic, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 187, 210–11 (2010); Seema
Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use During Pregnancy,
26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 241, 261 (2011); Medha D. Makhlouf, The Public Charge Rule as
Public Health Policy, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 177, 196 (2019); Aila Hoss, Federal Indian Law
as a Structural Determinant of Health, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS S34 (2019). They are not wrong.
Structural determinants are a subset of social determinants of health. The World Health
Organization Commission on the Social Determinants of Health “has purposely adopted a broad
initial definition of the social determinants of health,” which “encompasses the full set of social
conditions in which people live and work” including both the “structural determinants of health
inequities” and “the more immediate determinants of individual health.” ORIELLE SOLAR & ALEC
IRWIN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION ON THE SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS
OF
HEALTH
9
(2010),
https://www.who.int/sdhconference/resources/ConceptualframeworkforactiononSDH_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AT3W-JKSU]. The structural determinants of health inequities include “social
and political mechanisms that generate, configure and maintain social hierarchies,” while the
more immediate determinants of individual health include “material circumstances; psychosocial
circumstances; behavioral and/or biological factors; and the health system itself.” Id. at 5–6.
Health-care providers seeking to provide limited support for the material needs of individual
patients (e.g., housing stability, utilities, and transportation) in response to outcome-based
reimbursement models have increasingly coopted the term social determinants of health,
prompting some public health advocates to prefer more distinct labels, such as structural
determinants or political determinants to describe law, policy, and economic and social
conditions such as structural racism. See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, The Struggle for the Soul of
Public Health, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1083 (2016). We use the original term, describing
law and solidarity as social determinants of health, in an effort to reclaim its original, broader
meaning.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See Wiley, supra note 20, at 227.
28. Lindsay F. Wiley, Structural Racism, Social Determinants, and the Contested Scope of
Public Health Law, HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR. BLOG (Sept. 29, 2020),
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“old” public health law of communicable disease control is “concerned with
such undertakings as compulsory vaccination and treatment, isolation and
quarantine, and disease surveillance.” 29 It was built on the microbial and
behavioral models of public health. The microbial model “focuses on medical
countermeasures to attack the pathogen” while the behavioral model focuses
on “altering the behavior of individual ‘hosts’ to reduce their susceptibility to
disease and the risks they pose to others.” 30
“In contrast, the ‘new’ public health seeks ‘to expand communal
provision’ and address structural racism and other forms of social
subordination.”31 This approach responds to the insights of social
epidemiology32—the study of how social, economic, environmental, and
cultural factors shape patterns of morbidity and mortality. 33 Proponents of the
new public health adopt a social-ecological model. 34 They “search for defects
in the community and the environment rather than in the individual; . . . to
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/29/structural-racism-social-determinantshealth-law/ [https://perma.cc/WXQ8-FT6L]; see also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F.
WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 20–26 (3d ed. 2016) (describing
evolving models of public health problem solving and their influence on “old” and “new” public
health law).
29. See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 20.
30. Wiley, supra note 28; see also GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 21–23 (describing
the agent—also known as microbial—and behavioral models of public health problem solving).
31. Wiley, supra note 28 (first quoting DAN E. BEAUCHAMP, THE HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC:
EPIDEMICS, MEDICINE, AND MORALISM AS CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY 204 (1988); and then
citing Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to
Challenging Structural Inequality, 66 UCLA L. REV. 758, 762 n.4, 810 (2020) (arguing that health
disparities cannot be adequately addressed by strategies that fail to account for how structural
inequalities created by subordination, “a set of policies, practices, traditions, norms, definitions,
cultural stories, and explanations that function to systematically hold down one social group to
the benefit of another social group” based on markers of social stigma such as race, gender,
sexuality, and class (quoting ROBIN DIANGELO, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WHITE?
DEVELOPING WHITE RACIAL LITERACY 61 (Shirley R. Steinberg ed., 2012)))).
32. See Burris, supra note 21, at 1654 (“Responding to the findings of . . . social
epidemiology is perhaps the true ‘grand challenge’ of our time in public health.”).
33. See generally SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY (Lisa F. Berkman, Ichiro Kawachi & M. Maria
Glymour eds., 2d ed. 2014) (explaining social epidemiology); NANCY KRIEGER, EPIDEMIOLOGY
AND THE PEOPLE’S HEALTH: THEORY AND CONTEXT 163 (2011) (describing social epidemiology
as an “alternative to biomedical and lifestyle theorizing about disease distribution”). Social
epidemiology and the social determinants of health have deep implications for solidarity as a
foundation of public health. Solidarity, like law, is a social determinant of health. See Dawson &
Jennings, supra note 9, at 77 (“[T]he structural conditions that undermine (or sustain) solidarity
among social groups are related to key indicators of health and well-being.”).
34. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 381 (discussing the application of the socialecological model of public health to communicable disease prevention and control); see also;
Awofeso, supra note 20, at 707 (discussing the application of “new public health” to develop a
“more humane and less stigmatizing” approach to quarantine). See generally KRIEGER, supra note
33.

1242

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

see social problems, in a word, as social.” 35 The behavioral model supports
an ethos of personal responsibility for health; the social-ecological model
demands a more community-minded approach. 36
Critics of “an expansive public health philosophy grounded in
fundamental socioeconomic and cultural transformation” argue that it pushes
too hard against the traditional boundaries of public health practice, policy,
and law.37 The new public health movement has been characterized as a threat
to individual freedoms38 and to the coherence and neutrality of public health
as a field.39 But the coronavirus pandemic, we argue, shows why a social
focus is essential to achieving individual freedom as well as community
solidarity.
Critical analysis of public health ethics, practice, law, and policy typically
assumes a dichotomy between solidarity and individual freedom. 40 But our
experience with the coronavirus pandemic—much like our experience with
the HIV pandemic41—suggests this dichotomy isn’t always so clear. Liberty
35. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 31, at 204 (quoting WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 15–
16 (1st ed. 1971)); Wiley, supra note 28.
36. Wiley, supra note 20, at 227; see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita
Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United
States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 72 (1999) (“[S]eeing public health predominantly as the control of
risky behavior can quickly become, for cultural and political reasons, a warrant for treating health
entirely as a matter of personal responsibility.”); SOLAR & IRWIN, supra note 25, at 4 (“Having
health framed as a social phenomenon emphasizes health as a topic of social justice more
broadly.”).
37. Lawrence O. Gostin, Jo Ivey Boufford & Rose Marie Martinez, The Future of the
Public’s Health: Vision, Values, and Strategies, 23 HEALTH AFFS. 96, 96 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Mark. A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 144, 148 (2002) [hereinafter Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health];
Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the “Old” Public Health,
46 PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED. S138, S139 (2003); Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public
Health Law, 46 PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S203 (2003); Mark A. Rothstein, The Limits of
Public Health: A Response, 2 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 84, 85 (2009) [hereinafter Rothstein, The
Limits of Public Health].
39. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health, Ethics, and Human Rights: A Tribute to
the Late Jonathan Mann, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 121, 123 (2001); Rothstein, Rethinking the
Meaning of Public Health, supra note 38, at 147; Hall, supra note 38, at S205; LAWRENCE O.
GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 41 (2d. ed. 2008); Rothstein, The Limits
of Public Health, supra note 38, at 85.
40. See, e.g., Dawson & Jennings, supra note 9, at 71 (“[S]olidarity with fellow citizens is
not as important to Americans as being able to chart the course of their own individual [destinies]”
(quoting Rosemarie Tong, Shaping Ethical Guidelines for an Influenza Pandemic, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS 215, 219 (Michael Boylan ed., 2008)).
41. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 31, at 202 (“The most common misreading [of the ethical and
moral issues that loom over the AIDS epidemic] is that the conflict is between the ethos of public
health and that of civil liberty.”); see also Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care:
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includes a worker’s freedom to adopt protective public health practices
without fear of adverse employment consequences. Solidarity can be libertypromoting in the face of a public health crisis with potential for enormous
social, economic, and cultural disruption. Moreover, the pandemic has
provided horrifying evidence that when public health interventions depend
on individual behavior change while disregarding the social determinants that
constrain individuals’ choices, they are ineffective and unjust.
This article argues that effective pandemic prevention and response
demands an approach rooted in solidarity, which in turn requires employment
and antidiscrimination reforms to enable everyone to follow public health
guidance for the protection of themselves and others. Our analysis
emphasizes some features that are unique to how SARS-CoV-2, the virus that
causes COVID-19, is transmitted. But our proposals also draw on experience
with past pandemics—especially HIV—and are relevant to prevention of and
response to future pandemics for which vaccines and therapeutics may be
inadequate. When health officials rely on community mitigation strategies to
slow the spread of infection, their urgent calls for individuals to change their
behaviors must be accompanied by supports, accommodations, and legal
protections. Otherwise, their efforts may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate,
injustice, and their efficacy will be limited.
We make our argument in three parts. In Part I, we describe the community
mitigation strategies adopted to slow the spread of the coronavirus pandemic.
These strategies have relied heavily on requiring individuals to change their
behavior. They include isolation of infected individuals and quarantine of
their exposed contacts, social distancing to reduce contacts among the general
population, infection control protocols, and shielding for people who are
particularly vulnerable to COVID-19.42 The result has been to cause severe
COVID-19 illness and mortality—and the economic devastation that have
accompanied it—to be disproportionately concentrated among socially
subordinated groups.43 The benefits and burdens of public health responses
to the coronavirus pandemic have been unjustly distributed in ways that
exacerbate social fragmentation.44 Restrictions on public services and private
Lessons from HIV Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV. 831, 835–36 (1998) (arguing that individual rights to
privacy and nondiscrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations support HIV
prevention goals).
42. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing, 19 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 50 (2020).
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. See, e.g., Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality
Worsens
Its
Spread,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html
[https://perma.cc/8F5C-YUKE].
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activities have disproportionately burdened people living in low-income
households, people with disabilities, people of color, and women. 45 At the
same time, the severe illnesses and deaths that have continued to occur in
spite of public health responses have been disproportionately concentrated
among people of color, disabled people, and people from low-income
families as well.46
In Part II, we argue that fundamentally individualistic employment and
antidiscrimination laws have undermined—rather than supported—workers’
ability to protect themselves and others. The law has failed to protect people
who live and work in congregate institutions47 (including nursing homes,
prisons, jails, detention facilities, factories, warehouses, and schools) and
thus has failed to protect the broader communities with which these
institutions are interconnected. Together, public health and employment laws
have put the onus on individuals to adopt protective behaviors without
providing them with the supports, accommodations, and protections they
45. See, e.g., Megan Kuhfeld, James Soland & Beth Tarasawa, Projecting the Potential
Impact of COVID-19 School Closures on Academic Achievement, 49 EDUC. RESEARCHER 549
(2020); Lauren Bauer, Kristen E. Broady, Wendy Edelberg & Jimmy O’Donnell, Ten Facts About
COVID-19
and
the
U.S.
Economy,
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
17,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/ten-facts-about-covid-19-and-the-u-s-economy/
[https://perma.cc/D679-KYLL]; Tom Ridge & Ted Kennedy Jr., Opinion, People with
Disabilities See Huge Job Losses; Will Pandemic Roll Back ADA Gains?, HILL (July 22, 2020,
9:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/508221-people-with-disabilities-see-huge-joblosses-will-pandemic-roll-back-ada [https://perma.cc/9BWK-S6LL]; Bram Sable-Smith,
Pandemic Upends the Lives of People with Disabilities—and of their Caregivers, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Jun. 17, 2020), https://khn.org/news/pandemic-upends-the-lives-of-people-withdisabilities-and-of-their-caregivers/ [https://perma.cc/S978-2Q5H]; Julie Kashen, Sarah Jane
Glynn & Amanda Novello, How COVID-19 Sent Women’s Workforce Progress Backward:
Congress’ $64.5 Billion Mistake, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 30, 2020, 9:04 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/10/30/492582/covid-19-sentwomens-workforce-progress-backward/ [https://perma.cc/7USM-5FC4].
46. Samrachana Adhikari, Nicholas P. Pantaleo, Justin M. Feldman, Olugbenga Ogedegbe,
Lorna Thorpe & Andrea B. Troxel, Assessment of Community-Level Disparities in Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Infections and Deaths in Large US Metropolitan Areas, 3 JAMA
NETWORK OPEN e2016938 (2020); Nancy Krieger, Pamela D. Waterman & Jarvis T. Chen,
COVID-19 and Overall Mortality Inequities in the Surge in Death Rates by Zip Code
Characteristics: Massachusetts, January 1 to May 19, 2020, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1850
(2020); Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities Persist—and in Some
Cases Worsen, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-pandemic-deaths-add-up-racial-disparities-persist-and-in-somecases-worsen [https://perma.cc/3L9E-QAML].
47. Michael Grabell, Bernice Yeung & Maryam Jameel, Millions of Essential Workers Are
Being Left Out of COVID-19 Workplace Safety Protections, Thanks to OSHA, PROPUBLICA (Apr.
16, 2020, 7:52 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/millions-of-essential-workers-are-beingleft-out-of-covid-19-workplace-safety-protections-thanks-to-osha
[https://perma.cc/6LU8FDCN].
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need to do so. In Part III, we chart a course for a more just approach—for this
pandemic and the next one—built on a core commitment to social solidarity
in public health law and employment and antidiscrimination law.
We identify three key areas for reform. First, public health law should
prioritize supports that create the conditions required to mitigate the spread
of infection; it should deemphasize punitive measures targeting individuals.
Second, employment law should protect workers from infection, including
through workplace safety, privacy, and antidiscrimination protections that
enable them to adopt protective health behaviors. Finally, for individuals for
whom returning to work would be especially unsafe—whether because their
employers maintain particularly dangerous conditions or because of their
own, or their family members’, underlying health conditions—employment
law should remove any obligation to return while the special dangers
associated with the pandemic persist.
In addition to making concrete proposals for reform, our argument makes
a number of contributions to the academic literature in both public health and
employment law. We add to the prior literature by showing that a broad vision
of public health law that encompasses action on the social determinants of
health in “non-health” sectors such as employment and antidiscrimination
law is not merely tenable; it is essential.48 We believe the U.S. experience
with the coronavirus pandemic puts the final nail in the coffin of the old
public health, with its cramped focus on microbial and behavioral
48. Compare Epstein, supra note 38 (defending the “old” public health and arguing that the
new public health threatens individual liberty), and Hall, supra note 38 (arguing that a broader
vision of public health law poses threats to individual liberty and coherence of the field), and
Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, supra note 38 (arguing for a narrow scope
for public health law that does not encompass action on the social determinants of health based
on concerns about individual liberty and coherence of the field), and Rothstein, The Limits of
Public Health, supra note 38, at 84 (arguing for “a narrow, more precise definition of public
health instead of the open-ended and impractically broad one suggested by Goldberg”), and
Gostin, supra note 39 (arguing that a broad vision of public health law encompassing action to
ameliorate poverty and discrimination threatens the coherence and perceived scientific neutrality
of the field), and GOSTIN, supra note 39, at 41 (describing a “dilemma” whereby “[i]f it conceives
of itself too narrowly, public health will be accused of lacking vision[,]” but if “public health
conceives of itself too expansively, . . . . [t]he field will lose its ability to explain its mission and
functions in comprehensible terms and, consequently, to sell public health in the marketplace of
politics and priorities”), with Daniel S. Goldberg, In Support of a Broad Model of Public Health:
Disparities, Social Epidemiology and Public Health Causation, 2 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 70 (2009)
(arguing that a narrow vision of public health law and policy is untenable in light of the findings
of social epidemiology regarding the causes of health disparities), and Wiley, supra note 20, at
213 (arguing that a narrow vision of public health law would disconnect it from the inherently
interventionist and progressive foundations of public health science and practice), and GOSTIN &
WILEY, supra note 28, at 35 (embracing a broad vision of public health law with a focus on the
“underlying social, economic, and environmental causes of injury and disease” while
acknowledging the criticisms of the new public health).
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interventions.49 Individualistic strategies to change behavior have been
utterly unsuccessful in the face of COVID-19.50 What are needed are
solidaristic efforts to create the social and economic conditions required for
people to protect themselves and others. To the “so what?” critique raised by
some commentators who say they support commitments to socioeconomic
justice, social solidarity, and racial equality but question the value of
characterizing them as public health issues, 51 we offer a resounding reply. We
do more than merely point to public health impacts as a reason to do
something about the social determinants of health and leaving it at that. Our
collaboration—as a public health law scholar and a scholar of employment
and antidiscrimination law—demonstrates the power of placing public health
principles at the center of legal frameworks that govern “non-health” sectors
and placing social solidarity at the center of public health. 52
And we make two distinct contributions to the employment and
antidiscrimination law literature. The first has to do with the normative
foundations of the field. Prior academic discussions of employment and
antidiscrimination law have identified a diverse set of justifications for legal
regulation in this area, notably including economic efficiency, 53 individual
49. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 21–23.
50. See Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8ZU-GGBZ] (Nov. 3, 2020, 8:45 PM) (reporting COVID-19 cases, with
details on cases at colleges, prisons, and nursing homes).
51. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 38, at S208 (“Beyond the public health arena, there are other
good reasons for the government to pursue the more general aims of education, taxation,
regulation, and redistribution, but these are broader social and economic policies or they belong
to legal realms other than health. Public health advocates can be commended for calling our
attention to the health implications of social disparities, but health promotion should not be the
primary objective of corrective measures.”); Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health, supra note
38, at 86 (“[C]oncerns about social justice should play a part in priority setting for public health.
My point is simply that resolution of underlying socioeconomic and political problems is beyond
the domain of public health.”).
52. See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 35 (“[P]ublic health advocates can introduce
public health problem-solving models into the work of [experts in] sectors such as agriculture,
housing, and transportation. Collaboration, not colonization should be the model for public health
strategies that cut across ‘non-health’ sectors.”); see also Scott Burris, Alexander C. Wagenaar,
Jeffrey Swanson, Jennifer K. Ibrahim, Jennifer Wood & Michelle M. Mello, Making the Case for
Laws that Improve Health: A Framework for Public Health Law Research, 88 MILBANK Q. 169,
176 (2010) (calling for collaborative and interdisciplinary research on the impacts of “incidental
public health law, that is, the effects on population health of law, agencies, and private actors not
commonly understood to be pursuing a public health mission”). For another such collaboration,
see Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 31, at 762–63 (stating that “[i]n this Article, we—a critical
race theorist and a health justice lawyer—argue that subordination is a public health problem.”).
53. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR
LAW 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of
Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 33 (2001).
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fairness,54 antisubordination and social equality,55 and redistribution.56
Although all of these normative principles are implicated in this context and
inform our account, we bring to the foreground an additional justification for
employment and antidiscrimination law—to promote solidarity by ensuring
that the burdens and benefits of measures that serve the public as a whole are
shared equitably. Social solidarity may offer a useful way of understanding
the application of these bodies of law in other health-related contexts as well,
such as genetic discrimination and workplace injuries. Second, and perhaps
more significantly, we show that the attribution of fault and responsibility is
a persistent obsession of employment and antidiscrimination law. Prior work,
including some of our own, has pointed to dynamics like these in the
application of particular doctrines and programs. 57 But we go beyond those
prior accounts by demonstrating that the fault/responsibility paradigm is
pervasive—even in contexts such as workers’ compensation where the law
formally and explicitly rejects fault as a basis for imposing liability. This is a
point that should be of broad interest to employment and public health law
scholars alike.
I.

THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY PARADIGM AND THE LIMITS OF THE
U.S. PANDEMIC RESPONSE

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) guidance for
community mitigation of COVID-19 prominently features a commitment to
“emphasizing individual responsibility for implementing recommended
personal-level actions . . . particularly in ways that protect persons at
54. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1357, 1374 (2017).
55. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 225, 235 (2013).
56. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 441, 452 (2020).
57. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (2004)
[hereinafter Bagenstos, Future of Disability Law] (describing how courts have read the Americans
with Disabilities Act narrowly to limit its accommodation mandate to cases that seem intuitively
to involve employer fault and responsibility); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
Structural Turn] (arguing that a similar dynamic will undercut any effort to use antidiscrimination
law to root out structural bias); Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of
Obesity Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 153–58 (2013) (arguing that workplace wellness
programs ostensibly intended to improve employees’ health are rooted in individualistic notions
of shame and blameworthiness and penalize employees based on their failure to attain certain
health markers, rather than fostering employer responsibility for creating healthier workplaces).
Recent work on the “tortification” of antidiscrimination law sounds similar themes. See, e.g.,
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 721 (2016).
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increased risk of severe illness.”58 Framing the threat of disease in terms of
personal responsibility for behaviors that are within the control of individuals
is deeply rooted in social psychology.59 It is also highly protective of business
interests and fiscal conservatism.60 In the coronavirus pandemic, the ethos of
personal responsibility has served to deflect blame from government failures.
But it is best understood as a strategy of last resort given the abdication of
federal responsibility for funding and coordinating a modern response based
on testing, tracing, and supported isolation.61

58. Community Mitigation Resources, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/community-mitigationconcepts.html [https://perma.cc/E6LX-LE3T] (June 29, 2020).
59. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, EXPLAINING EPIDEMICS AND OTHER STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF MEDICINE 274 (1992) (“The desire to explain sickness and death in terms of volition—of acts
done or left undone—is ancient and powerful. The threat of disease provides a compelling reason
to find prospective reassurance in aspects of behavior subject to individual control.”); Christian
S. Crandall & Rebecca Martinez, Culture, Ideology, and Antifat Attitudes, 22 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1165, 1166 (1996) (attributing health problems to personal failures “serves a
symbolic, or value-expressive function . . . , reinforcing a worldview consistent with a belief in a
just world, self-determination, the Protestant work ethic, self-contained individualism, and the
notion that people get what they deserve.”).
60. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Micah L. Berman & Doug Blanke, Who’s Your Nanny?
Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 88, 90 (2013) (“Many people do not want their own wealth to be redistributed to help
others. They do not want their own choices restricted simply because others are making bad
choices. And so they argue that those other people’s problems are a matter of ‘personal
responsibility.’”).
61. There has been remarkable consensus among public health experts that testing, tracing,
and supported isolation is the key to a more targeted response. See, e.g., Linda Lacina, WHO
Coronavirus Briefing: Isolation, Testing and Tracing Comprise the ‘Backbone’ of Response,
WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/testing-tracingbackbone-who-coronavirus-wednesdays-briefing/
[https://perma.cc/JFC6-EPB6];
Geoff
Brumfiel, To End the Coronavirus Crisis We Need Widespread Testing, Experts Say, NPR (Mar.
24, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/24/820157519/to-endthe-coronavirus-crisis-we-need-widespread-testing-experts-say [https://perma.cc/Z6Y3-XH84];
DANIELLE ALLEN ET AL., ROADMAP TO PANDEMIC RESILIENCE: MASSIVE SCALE TESTING,
TRACING, AND SUPPORTED ISOLATION (TTSI) AS THE PATH TO PANDEMIC RESILIENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY
7,
38
(Apr.
20,
2020),
https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-forethics/files/roadmaptopandemicresilience_updated_4.20.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/78HM-5P3N]
(noting that “[t]o succeed, isolation must be supported with job protections, resource support, and
health care” and urging Congress to appropriate sufficient funds for testing, tracing, and supported
isolation); Franco Ordoñez, Ex-Officials Call for $46 Billion for Tracing, Isolating in Next
Coronavirus
Package,
NPR
(Apr.
27,
2020,
5:13
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/27/845165404/ex-officials-call-for-46-billion-for-tracingisolating-in-next-coronavirus-packa [https://perma.cc/NKF9-SJA7].

52:1235]

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY PANDEMIC

1249

A. From Failed Community Containment to Failed Community
Mitigation
In the face of a global pandemic, the goals of governmental responses may
differ from place to place and time to time. In the early days of the pandemic,
the focus of U.S. health officials was on containment—preventing the
epidemic from reaching our shores by isolating and quarantining travelers
and their contacts before community transmission could become
widespread.62 When containment efforts failed in the United States, the focus
shifted to mitigation—slowing the spread of infection to flatten the curve of
the epidemic.63 Some advocated for a stronger response aimed at
suppression—crushing the curve to very low levels of community
transmission by reducing the viral reproduction number (R 0) to below 1.64
62. See Rochelle P. Walensky & Carlos del Rio, Opinion, From Mitigation to Containment
of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Putting the SARS-CoV-2 Genie Back in the Bottle, 323 JAMA 1889,
1889 (2020) (“As part of pandemic preparedness, epidemiologists promote ‘containment
strategies’ designed to prevent community transmission.”); see also Containment, A DICTIONARY
OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (Miquel Porta ed., 5th ed. 2008) (defining containment as “regional eradication
of communicable disease”).
63. Walensky & del Rio, supra note 62, at 1889 (“When disease outpaces containment,
countries rely on ‘mitigation strategies.’”). The now-ubiquitous phrase “flatten the curve” refers
to a mitigation strategy identified through historical analysis of the 1918 influenza pandemic and
endorsed in U.S. pandemic influenza plans in 2007. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
INTERIM
PRE-PANDEMIC
PLANNING
GUIDANCE
9
(2007),
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/11425 [https://perma.cc/95K9-97QZ] (“Reshaping the demand
for healthcare services by using [nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), including social
distancing] . . . means reducing the burdens on the medical and public health infrastructure by
decreasing demand for medical services at the peak of the epidemic and throughout the epidemic
wave; by spreading the aggregate demand over a longer time; and, to the extent possible, by
reducing net demand through reduction in patient numbers and case severity.”); see also Noreen
Qualls et al., Community Mitigation Guidelines To Prevent Pandemic Influenza—United States,
2017, 66 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY W KLY . REP. 1, 18 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/rr/pdfs/rr6601.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MY42TA4C] (“Although there is limited empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of
implementing any individual measure alone (other than school closures and dismissals), the
evidence for implementing multiple social distancing measures in combination with other NPIs
includes systematic literature reviews, historical analyses of the 1918 pandemic, and
mathematical modeling studies . . . .”).
64. NEIL M. FERGUSON ET AL., IMPERIAL COLL. LONDON, REPORT 9: IMPACT OF NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS (NPIS) TO REDUCE COVID-19 MORTALITY AND HEALTHCARE
DEMAND 1 (2020) (“Two fundamental strategies are possible: (a) mitigation, which focuses on
slowing but not necessarily stopping epidemic spread—reducing peak healthcare demand while
protecting those most at risk of severe disease from infection, and (b) suppression, which aims to
reverse epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low levels and maintaining that situation
indefinitely.”); see also Harvey V. Fineberg, Editorial, Ten Weeks To Crush the Curve, 382 NEW
ENG. J. MED. e37 (2020) (“The aim [of suppression] is not to flatten the curve; the goal is to crush
the curve.”).
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In the absence of effective vaccines and therapeutics, each of these
strategies relies on measures implemented in community, rather than clinical,
settings. Community containment to prevent widespread transmission relies
on impeccable government coordination and ready access to testing to screen
travelers and put them into isolation (if suspected of being infected) or
quarantine (if suspected of having been exposed), then doing the same for
their traced contacts.65 Community mitigation to slow the spread of disease
once transmission has become widespread relies on personal hygiene (handwashing and mask-wearing) and reduction in personal movement and
business operations to decrease social mixing and increase social distance
among people who don’t share a household. 66 Community suppression
strategies to drive down the rate of transmission to very low levels rely on
comprehensively screening the population for infection through widespread
testing, isolating those who test positive for as long as their infection is
communicable, and tracing and quarantining their close contacts for the
duration of the incubation period.67
Infectious-disease-control regulations and emergency orders facilitate
community containment, mitigation, and suppression measures. 68 Federal,
state, and local statutes authorize isolation and quarantine of individuals who
are reasonably believed to be infected or to have been exposed. 69 When
testing is available, health officials, employers, and other private institutions
are empowered to require it.70 They also may require symptom checks and
other screening tools for individualized risk assessment. 71 In the absence of
widespread testing, health officials have acted on the assumption that anyone

65. See Walensky & del Rio, supra note 62, at 1889 (“For . . . (COVID-19), countries like
South Korea—an example of successful containment—had a coordinated governmental response,
testing on a massive scale, and prompt contact tracing and quarantine.”).
66. Id. (“Mitigation relies on nonpharmaceutical interventions such as hand hygiene, travel
restrictions, school closures, and social distancing. While a blunt and inconvenient tool, social
distancing has proven in pandemic influenza (in both 1918 and 2009) to reduce and delay peak
attack rates and mortality.”); see also STANLEY M. LEMON ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING PANDEMIC DISEASE 5 (2007).
67. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 6, 15 (assuming testing, tracing, quarantine, and
isolation in addition to social distancing among the general population).
68. See Wiley, supra note 42, at 69–81.
69. State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/M4X7-NQ5D].
70. Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers Responding to Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19), May 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-response.html
[https://perma.cc/M672-J2QG] (May 6, 2020).
71. Id.
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could be a silent carrier of infection.72 That assumption is prudent in light of
evidence that pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission may play a
significant role in spreading the disease.73 Officials thus have recommended
or mandated various infection control protocols. 74 These have included maskwearing and physical distancing (staying six feet apart), 75 among other
measures. They have also included various orders to increase social distance
and decrease social mixing (reducing the number of contacts among nonhousehold members population-wide). These orders have restricted public
services, limited the operations of businesses, and required the general
population to stay at home except for work and errands deemed essential by
state and local officials.76 All of these measures have placed the onus on
individuals to mitigate transmission of, and shield themselves from, exposure
to the virus. Individuals must do so while coping with job loss and other
secondary harms caused by social, cultural, and economic disruption.
1.

Isolation and Quarantine of Infected and Exposed Individuals

In public health and legal terminology, isolation and quarantine have
distinct meanings, but both play a particularly important role in preventing
the spread of infection from place to place and person to person. Isolation
refers to separation of individuals known or believed to be infected from
others during the period of infectiousness.77 For those who are severely ill,
isolation is typically ensured by following special infection-control protocols
72. Social
Distancing,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html
[https://perma.cc/S2RB-4M2T] (July 15, 2020).
73. Pandemic Planning Scenarios, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/planning-scenarios.html
[https://perma.cc/7H3P-BREP] (Sept. 10, 2020).
74. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 72.
75. Although physical distancing and social distancing are now used interchangeably in
many educational materials for the general public and some U.S. executive orders, we use the
terms to refer to two distinct interventions. See infra text accompanying note 147. We use physical
distancing to refer to the actions individuals take to remain six feet away from others as much as
possible while outside the home. We use social distancing to refer to the actions governments and
other institutions take, such as closing gathering places and implementing distance education and
telework, to reduce interactions among people from different households. Social distancing in
this sense appears to have been derived by CDC and WHO pandemic-preparedness workgroups
from sociological terms—social distance and social mixing—used to describe social networks
that connect individuals. These terms appear to have entered the epidemiology lexicon through
studies of how social networks influence HIV transmission. See Wiley, supra note 43, 53 n.1.
76. See Wiley, supra note 42, at 69–81.
77. Quarantine and Isolation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/index.html [https://perma.cc/MPA6-BP2S] (Sept. 29, 2017).
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in the hospital.78 But for the mildly ill—and those with severe illness in
situations where hospitals are overwhelmed—health officials may
recommend or require isolation at home.79 Quarantine refers to separation of
individuals known or believed to be exposed to infection from others during
the incubation period between exposure and onset of symptoms or a positive
test result.80 Under some circumstances, quarantine may be carried out in a
facility outside the home. In many cases, however, individuals are urged—or
ordered—to stay home during the incubation period.81
In January 2020, U.S. federal officials initiated containment strategies in
response to reports of an outbreak of pneumonia in Wuhan, China, caused by
a novel coronavirus strain.82 These strategies sought to identify infected and
exposed travelers entering the United States from China and isolate or
quarantine them before they could infect others. 83 On January 29, the State
Department repatriated hundreds of Americans from Wuhan 84 and placed
them under federal quarantine orders. 85 They were held in governmentprovided facilities at March Air Reserve Base in California while being
monitored for symptoms and tested for infection during a fourteen-day

78. Infection Control Guidance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/infection-controlrecommendations.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2
F2019-ncov%2Finfection-control%2Fcontrol-recommendations.html [https://perma.cc/84LHELRV] (Nov. 4, 2020).
79. Qualls et al., supra note 63, at 1 (recommending “voluntary home isolation of ill
persons”).
80. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 77.
81. Qualls et al., supra note 63, at 1 (recommending “voluntary home quarantine of exposed
household members” of people known or suspected of being infected).
82. Erin Schumaker, Timeline: How Coronavirus Got Started, ABC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2020,
8:55 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story?id=69435165
[https://perma.cc/8TCC-6QVV].
83. Anita Patel, Daniel B. Jernigan & 2019-nCoV CDC Response Team, Initial Public
Health Response and Interim Clinical Guidance for the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Outbreak—
United States, December 31, 2019–February 4, 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 140, 142 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6905e1-H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3H9M-6JTM].
84. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HHS and CDC Receive Flight
Carrying
Repatriated
US
Citizens
(Jan.
29,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0129-repatriated-US-citizens.html
[https://perma.cc/R3R4-ZKVS].
85. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Media Telebriefing: Update on
2019
Novel
Coronavirus
(2019-nCoV)
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0131-2019-novel-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/8SSB-97ZW].
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incubation period.86 None tested positive.87 On January 30, CDC confirmed
the first known case of human-to-human transmission occurring within the
United States.88 A person who had acquired the infection overseas (but whose
infection had not been detected at the border) had transmitted it to a member
of their household.89 On January 31, Health and Human Services Secretary
Alex Azar issued a public health emergency determination.90
Meanwhile, many more travelers entered the United States from China
and other areas with severe outbreaks, including Italy. 91 A few reported to
hospitals with symptoms and were diagnosed with COVID-19. 92 State and
local authorities put significant resources into confirming these early patients
were complying with the requirement to self-isolate upon their release from
the hospital.93 “In the beginning, dozens of investigators, called ‘cluster
86. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Issues Federal Quarantine
Order to Repatriated U.S. Citizens at March Air Reserve Base (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0131-federal-quarantine-march-air-reservebase.html [https://perma.cc/TN7L-Q7GM].
87. Bill Chappell, 195 Americans Released from Coronavirus Quarantine at Southern
California Air Base, NPR (Feb. 11, 2020, 3:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/02/11/804915231/195-americans-are-released-from-coronavirus-quarantine-atcalifornia-air-base [https://perma.cc/DFU7-UCVY].
88. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Confirms Person-to-Person
Spread
of
New
Coronavirus
in
the
United
States
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0130-coronavirus-spread.html
[https://perma.cc/GL7R-4DJ6].
89. Id. The CDC later surveyed evidence suggesting that limited U.S. community
transmission among people with no known connection to travel within China likely began in late
January or early February. Michelle A. Jorden et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of
COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 680, 682 (2020).
90. Alex M. Azar II, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9DC7-49EJ].
91. Pierre Thomas, Jack Date, Sony Salzman & Eric M. Strauss, Disaster in Motion: 3.4
Million Travelers Poured into US as Coronavirus Pandemic Erupted, ABC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2020,
9:19 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/disaster-motion-34-million-travelers-poured-uscoronavirus/story?id=69933625 [https://perma.cc/WDA5-2Z8G].
92. Daniel B. Jernigan & CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Update: Public Health
Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Outbreak—United States, February 24, 2020, 69 CDC
MORBIDITY
&
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
216,
217
(2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6908e1-H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5P32A4T].
93. Emily Baumgaertner, The Inside Story of How California Failed Mass Coronavirus
Testing, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202007-12/california-fail-coronavirus-testing-covid-start [https://perma.cc/CN74-THE9] (describing
efforts to support isolation of the first person to be diagnosed with COVID-19 following his
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busters,’ worked each case to try to contain the spread of the coronavirus.” 94
In addition to tracing the infected person’s contacts, the investigators offered
critical supports to enable the infected person to stay home. “They functioned
as all-inclusive personal assistants: arranging child care, setting up WiFi,
coordinating grocery drop-offs.”95
By late February, it became clear that in spite of containment efforts,
people who hadn’t traveled overseas and hadn’t encountered someone known
to be infected were suffering from COVID-19. 96 Many state and local health
departments issued recommendations or orders directing people to stay home
if they were ill with COVID-19.97 But testing materials were in short supply. 98
The FDA had restricted testing to specifically certified labs. 99 Early CDC
guidelines had directed health-care providers to refer patients for testing only
if they had history of travel to China, had been exposed to a person known to
have been infected, or were hospitalized for pneumonia or acute respiratory
distress.100 Lack of access to testing meant that virtually all of the people
release from the hospital). The man had previously been identified as a traveler who had returned
to the United States from Wuhan. Ian Wheeler, Orange County Coronavirus Patient Released, in
Good Condition, Health Officials Say, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Feb. 5, 2020, 10:30 AM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2020/02/04/risk-of-catching-coronavirus-in-so-cal-is-low-healthofficials-say/ [https://perma.cc/9FEZ-V7MN].
94. Baumgaertner, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Confirms Possible
Instance of Community Spread of COVID-19 in U.S. (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0226-Covid-19-spread.html [https://perma.cc/8ZRHJBYG]; Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Announces Additional
COVID-19
Presumptive
Positive
Cases
(Feb.
28,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0228-additional-COVID-19-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/2V7D-S8BF].
97. See, e.g., Local Health Officials Announce New Recommendations To Reduce Risk of
Spread of COVID-19, KING CNTY. PUB. HEALTH NEWS & BLOG (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/health/news/2020/March/4-covid-recommendations.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F5YN-3K37] (“Public Health is recommending, but not requiring, the following
steps . . . people should not go out when they are sick.”).
98. Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure To Test Blinded the U.S. to
Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testingcoronavirus-pandemic.html [perma.cc/6TVD-C3W2].
99. 02/18/2020: Lab Advisory: Reminder: COVID-19 Diagnostic Testing, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dls/locs/2020/reminder_covid19_diagnostic_testing.html [https://perma.cc/GV54-QPVL] (Mar. 20, 2020).
100. Update and Interim Guidance on Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV),
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 1, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/HAN00427.asp [https://perma.cc/9MMN-DGJC]; Update and
Interim Guidance on Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Feb.
28,
2020,
3:05
PM),
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2020/HAN00428.asp [https://perma.cc/5AWW-6KUX].
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being asked to stay home (potentially with adverse consequences for their
employment) weren’t able to confirm whether they actually posed a risk of
transmitting the virus to others or were simply experiencing very common
symptoms like a cough or a stuffy nose. 101
2.

Social Distancing in the General Population

“By early March, after federal officials finally announced changes to
expand testing, it was too late. With the early lapses, containment was no
longer an option. The tool kit of epidemiology would shift—lockdowns,
social disruption, intensive medical treatment—in hopes of mitigating the
harm.”102 On March 16, 2020, “seven local health officers in the San
Francisco Bay Area followed the examples set by China and Italy and
issued mandatory shelter-in-place orders and prohibitions on all onsite
business operations deemed nonessential.” 103 Over the next two weeks, the
majority of state governors issued similar orders.104 In early April, as more
states added stay-at-home orders, others issued extensions. 105 These
measures were aimed at increasing social distance and decreasing social

101. See,
e.g.,
Chi.
Admin.
Order
No.
2020-1
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cdph/HealthProtectionandResponse/Order%20
re%20Shelter%20in%20Place%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2AJC-9XWW]
(ordering
residents to stay at home if they have any symptoms characteristic of COVID-19, “including, but
not limited to, new onset of fever, cough, shortness of breath, congestion in the nasal sinuses or
lungs, sore throat, body aches, or unusual fatigue”); see also Baumgaertner, supra note 93
(describing a woman and child who developed COVID-19 symptoms after their family member
returned home from China but were not tested due to stringent CDC criteria and scarce supplies
and potentially caused a subsequent outbreak among their contacts).
102. Shear et al., supra note 98.
103. See Wiley, supra note 42, at 74; City & Cnty. of S.F. Admin. Order No. C19–07 (Mar.
16,
2020),
https://sfgsa.org/sites/default/files/Document/OrderC19-07ShelterinPlace.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QY48-MFZW]; Julia Prodis Sulek, Meet the Doctor Who Ordered the Bay
Area’s Coronavirus Lockdown, the First in the U.S., MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2020, 3:55
PM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/29/she-shut-down-the-bay-area-to-slow-thedeadly-coronavirus-none-of-us-really-believed-we-would-do-it [https://perma.cc/K4DH-QYG8]
(describing the events that led seven local jurisdictions to simultaneously issue shelter-inplace orders).
104. Jennifer Kates, Josh Michaud & Jennifer Tolbert, Stay-at-Home Orders To Fight
COVID-19 in the United States: The Risks of a Scattershot Approach, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr.
5, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/stay-at-home-orders-to-fight-covid19
[https://perma.cc/G597-ZHYU]; see also State Data and Policy Actions To Address
Coronavirus, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2020) https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issuebrief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-address-coronavirus/#socialdistancing [https://perma.cc/
5XQU-CX58] (tracking state social-distancing executive orders).
105. Kates et al., supra note 104.
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mixing among the general population.106 In the absence of widespread testing,
and amid reports indicating asymptomatic carriers of infection were capable
of spreading the virus, governors, mayors, and state and county health
officials ordered everyone to stay at home.107 Or, rather, everyone except for
workers officials deemed “essential.”108
Pre-pandemic discussions barely scratched the surface of the enormous
disruption to individuals and communities that social distancing measures
would cause. As one of us wrote (with Professor Lawrence Gostin) in 2016,
“Social distancing, particularly for long durations, can severely disrupt the
economy and cause loneliness and depression. . . . As with many disease
mitigation strategies, the vulnerable would suffer most.”109 Rosemarie Tong’s
2008 memoir detailing her experiences serving on an influenza task force
convened by the North Carolina Department of Public Health previewed the
crisis to come.110 Tong offered a worrisome warning: “[D]uring an influenza
pandemic, so much would depend on society having well-developed systems
to meet people’s basic needs and on having adequate reservoirs of community
goodwill and public service at hand.” 111 Based on comments at a community
meeting hosted by the task force, she reported that “most people’s economic
situations would determine whether they stayed home from work voluntarily.
If their workplace was open and they needed the money to pay their bills,
people would drag themselves to work.” 112 Tong noted “the only sure ways

106. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 431–33 (discussing the role of decreased social
mixing and increased social distance in response to epidemics).
107. Kates et al., supra note 104.
108. Opinion, ‘You’re on Your Own,’ Essential Workers Are Being Told, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
20,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/opinion/osha-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/GK64-CE2P]; Shannon Bond, ‘We’re Out There’ So Protect Us, Protesting
Workers Tell Amazon, Target, Instacart, NPR (May 1, 2020, 4:14 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/01/849218750/workers-walk-off-jobs-demand-safer-workingconditions [https://perma.cc/P29R-ZGYU]. By using the term essential, we do not mean to
suggest that there is some apolitical, technocratic way of determining which workers are essential.
We use the term as shorthand for the classifications that individual and collective political actors
have drawn to determine which workers are allowed or required to stay on the job despite the
risks posed by the pandemic. See Wiley, supra note 42, at 94–106 (discussing these classifications
and litigation challenging them on equal protection and separation of powers grounds).
109. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 28, at 432.
110. Rosemarie Tong, Shaping Ethical Guidelines for an Influenza Pandemic, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS 215, 215 (Michael Boylan ed., 2008).
111. Id. at 225–26 (describing the work of the North Carolina Institute of
Medicine/Department of Public Health Task Force).
112. Id. at 225.
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to prevent this state of affairs would be to force workplaces to close or to pay
workers to stay home.”113
Rather than urging lawmakers to develop supports to ensure people in
low-income households could weather such a crisis, some pre-pandemic
plans focused on ensuring that essential workers reported for duty in spite of
fears for their health. Tong, for example, noted “it would be incumbent upon
government officials to get not only health care personnel but also other
socially essential personnel to do their jobs.”114 Essential needs raised
difficult questions: “How would food be delivered to isolated, quarantined,
or socially distanced people? . . . What, if anything, do workers in the food
industry owe the public; and what, if anything, does the public owe them?” 115
As the nature of the 2020 coronavirus pandemic shifted from “spread . . .
involv[ing] people with financial resources, such as cruise-goers and
international flyers,” to “a disease of the socially vulnerable,” 116 the supports
provided during the containment stage were not extended into the mitigation
phase.117 The sheer number of cases overwhelmed the limited staffing of
public health agencies.118 Congress did not supply the resources that would
be required for a massive ramp-up of testing, contact tracing, and supported
isolation.119 The general public was ordered to self-isolate and make their own
arrangements for food, medicines, and other essential needs. 120 Congress
appropriated funds to provide short-term support for businesses to cover
payroll and to supplement unemployment benefits.121 But workers who did
113. Id.; see also Kelly D. Blake, Robert J. Blendon & Kasisomayajula Viswanath,
Employment and Compliance with Pandemic Influenza Mitigation Recommendations, 16
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 212, 212 (2010) (“[I]nability to work from home, lack of paid
sick leave, and income are associated with working adults’ ability to comply and should be major
targets for workplace interventions in the event of a serious outbreak.”).
114. Tong, supra note 110, at 223.
115. Id. at 225.
116. Walensky & del Rio, supra note 62, at 1890.
117. See, e.g., Taylor Dolven, No Information. No Way Off. 100,000 Crew Members Remain
in Cruise Ship Limbo for Months, MIA. HERALD (July 13, 2020, 4:36 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article242565281.html
[https://perma.cc/35WC-TPA7].
118. Rob Stein, Pandemic Is Overwhelming U.S. Public Health Capacity in Many States.
What Now?, NPR (July 28, 2020, 5:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/07/28/894858475/pandemic-is-overwhelming-u-s-public-health-capacity-in-manystates-what-now [https://perma.cc/GE77-SK6T].
119. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 6.
120. See, e.g., Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-07 (Fourth Amended) (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/1919.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6Q7-T98X]; Ga.
Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02 (Apr. 23, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/document/2020-executiveorder/04232002/download [https://perma.cc/S7GB-FK7E].
121. See infra Part II.B.
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not have the option of staying home were left exposed, risking their own
health and potentially spreading the infection to their household members. 122
Starting in late April, governors began to lift restrictions on businesses and
the general public.123 Many states reopened even high-risk, non-essential
businesses like bars and indoor dining.124 They did so even though the states
had not met critical gating criteria.125 The White House, along with many state
and local governments, had issued guidelines to ensure that social distancing
interventions would be eased gradually and accompanied by a ramp-up of
more targeted measures—testing, contact tracing, isolation of infected cases,
and quarantine of their exposed contacts—to detect clusters and stop chains
of transmission before outbreaks got out of control.126 The White House
guidelines for reopening businesses, for example, adopted reasonably
cautious criteria for moving from one phase to the next.127 These criteria
included sustained reduction in cases or in positive tests as a percent of total
tests between each phase.128 But the federal plan left states—which lack
authority to deficit-spend or coordinate interstate supply chains for scarce
testing supplies—largely on their own to ramp up targeted measures. 129
Without support from the federal government, testing and contact tracing
weren’t up to the task.130 Meanwhile, some governors charged forward with
122. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 6 (assuming that social distancing of the entire
population causes household contact rates to increase by 25%); see also infra Part II.A.
123. Keith Collins & Lauren Leatherby, Most States that Are Reopening Fail To Meet White
House
Guidelines,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/07/us/coronavirus-states-reopen-criteria.html
[https://perma.cc/N3C8-XNA2].
124. See Alaa Elassar, This Is Where Each State Is During Its Phased Reopening, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-coronavirus-trnd/
[https://perma.cc/VBW5-UELU] (May 27, 2020, 10:00 PM).
125. Collins & Leatherby, supra note 123.
126. See Wiley, supra note 42, at 76–79.
127. See The White House & Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Guidelines: Opening
Up America Again, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/
[https://perma.cc/45AG-HVL5].
128. Id.; Press Release, The White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Guidelines
for Opening Up America Again (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-announces-guidelines-opening-america/
[https://perma.cc/7Y8W-DMZ5].
129. Michael D. Shear et al., Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush To Abandon Leadership Role
on
the
Virus,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-response-failureleadership.html [https://perma.cc/F8XR-3EJ3] (“[The White House aides’] ultimate goal was to
shift responsibility for leading the fight against the pandemic from the White House to the states.
They referred to this as ‘state authority handoff’ . . . .”); see Press Release, The White House,
supra note 128; The White House & Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 127.
130. Shear et al., supra note 98.
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reopening.131 More cautious governors were urged by the President to
“liberate” their states although the White House’s own criteria hadn’t been
satisfied.132
3.

Shielding for People Who Are Particularly Vulnerable

At various stages in the coronavirus pandemic response, some have argued
that “regular” people should go about their lives while people who are
particularly vulnerable due to age or chronic conditions shelter in place. 133
This strategy is distinct from social distancing to reduce the number of nonhousehold contacts among the general population. We adopt the term used
by public health authorities in other countries and call it shielding.134
Some governors have imposed mandatory shielding for older people and
those with particular chronic conditions as an alternative to issuing stay-athome orders for the general public.135 In April and May, as governors lifted
stay-at-home orders for the general population, some ordered people over
sixty-five and anyone with chronic conditions that put them at increased risk
to stay at home.136 Apart from advice to “use delivery and/or curbside services
whenever available,” these orders made few provisions to support
shielding.137
4.

Infection Control Protocols for High-Risk Settings

Orders requiring or recommending that people stay at home while
expecting workers to continue to provide for the population’s necessities have
131. Ordoñez, supra note 61.
132. Shear et al., supra note 129.
133. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Rethinking Generational Justice in Light of the Coronavirus
Catastrophe, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Mar. 12, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/03/12/rethinkinggenerational-justice-in-light-of-the-coronavirus-catastrophe
[https://perma.cc/LU3A-Z9L4]
(framing this perspective as “say[ing] that older people should be left to die”).
134. See, e.g., Public Health England, Guidance on Shielding and Protecting People Who
Are
Clinically
Extremely
Vulnerable
from
COVID-19,
GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-shielding-and-protecting-extremelyvulnerable-persons-from-covid-19/guidance-on-shielding-and-protecting-extremely-vulnerablepersons-from-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GAZ9-V445] (Nov. 13, 2020).
135. See, e.g., Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-07, supra note 120 (“Adults over the age of sixtyfive (65) and people of any age who have serious underlying medical conditions, collectively
referred to as ‘vulnerable individuals,’ shall stay in their home or place of residence except for
working in a critical infrastructure sector . . . and the conduct of essential errands.”).
136. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 120 (requiring all residents and
visitors who meet criteria for higher risk of severe illness as defined by CDC guidelines to shelter
in place except for conducting or participating in essential work and errands).
137. See, e.g., Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-07, supra note 120.
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done little to prevent outbreaks in congregate work and residential settings.
Indeed, one of the reasons that social distancing alone cannot achieve
suppression or containment is that as long as essential work and errands
continue, the virus continues to circulate.138 Large outbreaks in nursing
homes, prisons, meatpacking plants, and distribution warehouses were
reported in March and April.139 Personal protective equipment was scarce,140
and access to rapid-result testing was limited. 141 Federal, state, and local
officials issued guidance setting forth a wide range of infection control
measures for congregate facilities and other businesses that remained open. 142
But these measures were necessarily inadequate. Many relied on employees
to adopt protective behaviors, such as monitoring themselves for symptoms,
staying home when sick, wearing face coverings (which employers were not
typically required to provide), and staying six feet apart from others, as
practicable.143 Infection control protocols were expanded to virtually all
businesses as state and local officials began to allow them to reopen in late
April and May.144
In June and July, Sun Belt governors facing surging case counts were
committed to keeping businesses open and bringing students back onsite to
schools.145 They doubled down on infection control protocols in an attempt
138. Pandemic-preparedness plans consistently recommend that testing, tracing, and
supported isolation and quarantine should be combined with social distancing measures. See, e.g.,
FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 14–16; Tong, supra note 110, at 225. They were never meant
to be viewed as alternative approaches. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 14–16. Social
distancing is intended to reduce the overall number of non-household contacts in the general
public to levels that allow ramped-up public health infrastructure for testing and contact tracing
to get outbreaks under control, while also ensuring the need for hospital services stays within
available capacity. See id. at 6–8, 15; Laura Matrajt & Tiffany Leung, Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Social Distancing Interventions To Delay or Flatten the Epidemic Curve of
Coronavirus Disease, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1740, 1740 (2020),
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/8/20-1093_article [https://perma.cc/GYX6-J72K].
139. See, e.g., Waltenburg et al., supra note 16, at 887; Wallace et al., supra note 16, at 587.
140. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 108.
141. Steven Mufson, Juliet Eilperin & Josh Dawsey, The Scramble for the Rapid Coronavirus
Tests
Everybody
Wants,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
1,
2020,
5:24
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/04/01/scramble-rapid-coronavirus-testseverybody-wants/ [https://perma.cc/S72Z-ATBN].
142. Kates et al., supra note 104; KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 104.
143. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 3990-03, GUIDANCE ON
PREPARING
WORKPLACES
FOR
COVID-19,
at
8–10
(2020),
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3990.pdf [https://perma.cc/83BS-X832].
144. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 120 (setting forth detailed
infection control protocols for a wide range of settings).
145. Jonathan Levin & Emma Court, Patients Swamp Sun Belt Hospitals with Covid-19 on a
Rampage
(1),
BLOOMBERG
L.
(July
10,
2020,
3:20
AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/coronavirus/patients-swamp-sun-belt-hospitals-with-covid-19on-a-rampage [https://perma.cc/88K9-ZHE7].
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to assure the public that returning to work, school, and in-person commerce
would be safe.146 In some cases, executive orders twisted social distancing
from a term describing government responsibility for closing gathering
places to a matter of personal responsibility by demanding that employees
maintain physical distance while being required to work . . . in gathering
places.147
B. Unequal Benefits and Burdens
The U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic has distributed benefits
and burdens in deeply unjust ways. Low-wage workers, racial and ethnic
minority groups, immigrants, women, and other socially subordinated groups
have paid disproportionately heavy economic and social costs. At the same
time, some of these groups have been less able than others to reap the health
benefits of community mitigation.
The burdens of community mitigation (including unemployment,
disruption of education, health care, and more) have been disproportionately
borne by socially subordinated groups. A May 2020 study found that people
with jobs that cannot be done from home—who thus faced the highest risk of
unemployment—were disproportionately those with less income, wealth, and
education.148 Unsurprisingly, COVID-related job losses have been most
severe for people who are younger, who have less formal education, who
have lower incomes, and who identify as being part of racial and ethnic
minority groups.149 A June study found that “[s]ectors in which a higher
fraction of the workforce is not able to work remotely experienced
significantly greater declines in employment,” and that “[l]ower-paid
workers, especially female workers with young children, were significantly

146. See, e.g., Raga Justin, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Says “There Is No Shutdown Coming”
as Coronavirus Cases Surge, TEX. TRIB. (July 16, 2020, 8:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/16/texas-shutdown-greg-abbott/ [https://perma.cc/5KE38DVE].
147. See, e.g., id.; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 120 (“‘Social Distancing’
means keeping space between yourself and other people outside of your home or place of
residence. Persons practicing Social Distancing should stay at least six (6) feet from other people,
avoid assembling in groups, avoid crowded places, and avoid large crowds.”).
148. Simon Mongey, Laura Pilossoph & Alex Weinberg, Which Workers Bear the Burden of
Social Distancing Policies? 7–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27085, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27085.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQE2-FBCA].
149. Seung Jin Cho & John V. Winters, The Distributional Impacts of Early Employment
Losses from COVID-19, at 4, (Inst. of Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 13266, 2020),
http://ftp.iza.org/dp13266.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KAY-U4D3].
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more affected by these disruptions.”150 Longstanding racial and gender
discrimination in employment, segregation in job classifications, exploitation
of immigrant workers, and the unequal distribution of family obligations are
significant reasons for these disparities. 151
Although members of socially subordinated groups have
disproportionately paid the price for mitigation measures, they have been less
able to reap the corresponding health benefits. Not everyone is able to comply
with public health requirements and recommendations in ways that allow
them to benefit from community mitigation. In particular, the personal
responsibility strategy for COVID-19 has failed to protect low-wage workers
deemed “essential,” especially those who work in congregate and other highrisk settings.152 Because women, Black people, Indigenous people, Latinos,
and Latinas are overrepresented among essential low-wage workers—again
the result of longstanding discrimination and occupational segregation—the
benefits of our pandemic response have had a significant and harmful gender
and racial skew.153
150. Dimitris Papanikolaou & Lawrence D.W. Schmidt, Working Remotely and the SupplySide Impact of COVID-19, at 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27330, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27330.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5TZ-JG4Y].
151. See generally Connor Maxwell & Danyelle Solomon, The Economic Fallout of the
Coronavirus for People of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 14, 2020, 9:20 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2020/04/14/483125/economic-falloutcoronavirus-people-color/ [https://perma.cc/A3RD-GZGH] (discussing root causes of
COVID-19’s adverse economic efforts on communities of color).
152. See, e.g., Jim Vertuno, Grocery Workers Are Key During the Virus—and They’re Afraid,
NBC5 CHI. (Apr. 6, 2020, 10:31 AM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/coronavirus/groceryworkers-are-key-during-the-virus-and-theyre-afraid/2250687/ [https://perma.cc/7KW7-RSE5].
153. See generally COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.rtmsd.org/userfiles/270/My%20Files/COVID19%20in%20Racial%20and%20Ethnic%20Minority%20Groups%20_%20CDC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9G5A-2HFC] (Apr. 22, 2020) (noting that “[n]early a quarter of employed
Hispanic and Black or African American workers are employed in service industry jobs compared
to 16% of non-Hispanic whites”; and “Hispanic workers account for 17% of total employment
but constitute 53% of agricultural workers; Black or African Americans make up 12% of all
employed workers, but account for 30% of licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses”);
Hayley Brown, Shawn Fremstad & Hye Jin Rho, Racial Inequality Among Workers in Frontline
Industries: Black Workers Are Overrepresented and Undercompensated, CTR. FOR ECON. &
POL’Y RSCH. (June 4, 2020), https://cepr.net/racial-inequality-among-workers-in-frontlineindustries-black-workers-are-overrepresented-and-undercompensated/ [https://perma.cc/9UD5UUPU] (“[N]early three out of every ten (29.7 percent) Black workers work in one of six frontline
industry groups, compared to just under one out of every five (19.2 percent) White workers.”);
id. (“[A]bout one-third of (33.2 percent) Black workers in frontline industries live in families with
low incomes, compared to less than one-fifth (17.3 percent) of White workers.”); Yearby &
Mohapatra, supra note 17 (“Ninety percent of home health care workers are women, and twothirds of them are women of color.”); id. (“Fifty-one-and-a-half percent of those who are
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Low-wage workers often perform jobs that cannot be done from home. 154
They typically lack any financial cushion that would enable them to take
unpaid leave.155 These workers thus find themselves forced to place
themselves at risk.156 One recent study found that because “the initial
economic consequences of the pandemic are particularly harmful to lowincome individuals,” and those with higher incomes are more likely to be able
to work remotely, “self-protective behaviors, such [as] social-distancing, are
more practical, comfortable, and feasible for people with more income.” 157
Moreover, many low-wage essential workers live in overcrowded housing,
which they may share with others who are particularly vulnerable to COVID19.158 Crowded conditions make it virtually impossible to follow
recommendations for self-isolation from at-risk household members. 159
According to numerous observers, this dynamic has driven the alarmingly

considered frontline meatpacking workers are immigrants, compared with 17.0 percent of all
workers in the US. In contrast, 19.1 percent of frontline meatpacking workers are white, compared
to 63.5 percent of all workers.”).
154. Rachel Garfield, Matthew Rae, Gary Claxton & Kendal Orgera, Double Jeopardy: Low
Wage Workers at Risk for Health and Financial Implications of COVID-19, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/double-jeopardy-lowwage-workers-at-risk-for-health-and-financial-implications-of-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/GV75-8FM3].
155. See id. (discussing low-wage workers’ “precarious financial situations”).
156. Id.
157. Nicholas W. Papageorge et al., Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with SelfProtecting Behavior During the COVID-19 Pandemic 3 (Inst. of Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper
No. 13333, 2020), http://ftp.iza.org/dp13333.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CHZ-UVFE]. Another recent
study made the striking finding that, even “in the depths of the lockdown” in Seattle, “weekly and
daily cycles of travel consistent with commuting for work remain[ed] conspicuous among
residents of less-educated neighborhoods and among individuals using reduced-fare public transit
cards”—a finding the authors attributed to “the relative inability of less-educated and lowerincome people to work remotely.” Rebecca Brough, Matthew Freedman & David C. Phillips,
Understanding Socioeconomic Disparities in Travel Behavior During the COVID-19 Pandemic
4
(Aug.
31,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3624920 [https://perma.cc/BY4H-3TX2].
158. See, e.g., Justin Feldman, Does COVID-19’s Toll Reflect Social Inequality? Early
Evidence from NYC, MEDIUM (Apr. 2, 2020), https://medium.com/@jmfeldman/does-covid-19stoll-reflect-social-inequality-early-evidence-from-nyc-209c3b0a0ff7
[https://perma.cc/ULS8ZAPF] (documenting a strong relationship between the per-capita rate of emergency department
visits for influenza-like illness by zip code and the percentage of rental units where there is more
than one occupant per room); Cuellar Mejia & Cha, supra note 22.
159. Households Living in Close Quarters: How To Protect Those that Are Most Vulnerable,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/daily-life-coping/living-in-close-quarters.html [https://perma.cc/T5LM-7YZT] (Sept. 11,
2020).
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high rates of infection in many Black,160 Latino,161 and low-income
communities.162 This, of course, reflects the legacy of residential segregation
and policies that limit the availability of decent, affordable housing. 163
In addition to being at higher risk of contracting SARS-CoV-2, Black
people, Indigenous people, Latinos, and Latinas are at higher risk of severe
illness and death due to COVID-19.164 Multiple factors could be contributing
to these disparities, including exposure to higher doses of infectious particles
in high-risk settings, disparate access to high-quality health care, and
disparate treatment by health-care providers.165 Researchers have focused
particularly on the fact that Black, Indigenous, Latino, and Latina patients are
more likely to have underlying conditions—including diabetes, hypertension,
and chronic lung and kidney disease—that predispose them to more severe
COVID-19 illness and death.166 All of these factors are themselves
160. See, e.g., Rashawn Ray, Why Are Blacks Dying at Higher Rates from COVID-19?,
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/09/whyare-blacks-dying-at-higher-rates-from-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/67RS-W9QM].
161. See, e.g., Regina Garcia Cano, Anita Snow & Bryan Anderson, COVID-19 Is Ravaging
America’s
Vulnerable
Latino
Communities,
GBH
(June
21,
2020),
https://www.wgbh.org/news/national-news/2020/06/21/covid-19-is-ravaging-americasvulnerable-latino-communities [https://perma.cc/XMN2-MTHH]; Usha Lee McFarling, When
Hard Data Are ‘Heartbreaking’: Testing Blitz in San Francisco Shows Covid-19 Struck Mostly
Low-Wage Workers, STAT (May 28, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/28/soberingfinding-covid19-struck-mostly-low-wage-essential-workers-san-francisco/
[https://perma.cc/9TGR-FV4N].
162. See, e.g., Garfield et al., supra note 154.
163. See, e.g., John C. Austin, COVID-19 Is Turning the Midwest’s Long Legacy of
Segregation
Deadly,
BROOKINGS:
THE
AVE.
(Apr.
17,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/04/17/covid-19-is-turning-the-midwests-longlegacy-of-segregation-deadly/ [https://perma.cc/M9MF-R6EC].
164. Shanoor Seervai, Why Are More Black Americans Dying of COVID-19?, THE
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(June
26,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/podcast/2020/jun/why-are-more-blackamericans-dying-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/XN4V-64GW].
165. Id.
166. Id.; see CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TABLE A-1. SELECTED
CIRCULATOR DISEASES AMONG ADULTS AGED 18 AND OVER, BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS:
UNITED
STATES,
2018,
at
3
tbl.A-1a
(2018),
https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/NHIS/SHS/2018_SHS_Table_A-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96GM-YCAN] (reporting age-adjusted percentages of people with coronary
heart disease, hypertension, and stroke among U.S. adults by race and ethnicity); C TRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TABLE A-2, SELECTED RESPIRATORY DISEASES AMONG
ADULTS AGED 18 AND OVER, BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: UNITED STATES, 2018, at 3 tbl.A2a (2018), https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/NHIS/SHS/2018_SHS_Table_A2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX3C-G6VZ] (reporting age-adjusted percentages of people with
emphysema, asthma, and chronic bronchitis among U.S. adults by race and ethnicity); CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS REPORT 2020, at 4 fig.2
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significantly caused by a history of discrimination in employment, education,
and health care, residential segregation, and other forms of social
subordination.167 As Professor Angela Harris and her public-health-advocate
collaborator, Aysha Pamukcu, recently argued, “Subordination based on
markers of social stigma such as race, gender, sexuality, and class is chief
among the structural forces creating unjust access to health-promoting
opportunities and resources.”168
Our response to the coronavirus pandemic has predictably exacerbated
health disparities caused by structural racism and other forms of social
subordination. It has done so precisely because it has focused on individual,
rather than community, responsibility. In the next Part, we describe how the
same focus on blame and responsibility that has shaped the community
mitigation response to the pandemic is also deeply embedded in the
employment and antidiscrimination laws that might have been used to
cushion the blow, spread the costs more widely, and enable everyone to abide
by and benefit from public health recommendations. As Harris and Pamukcu
see it, the trouble with subordination is that it tends to be invisible. Americans
tend to see individual agency and blameworthiness, rather than focusing on
the institutional and structural context within which individuals make
choices.169 Like Harris and Pamukcu, we see the influence of this
individualistic bias in public health as well as in antidiscrimination law.
II.

THE FAULT/RESPONSIBILITY PARADIGM AND THE LIMITS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

Pandemic-preparedness plans pointed to the need for employment
protections and income supports to ensure the success of community
mitigation efforts.170 In this Part, we argue that instead of supporting public
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B4WF-PUDL] (reporting age-adjusted estimated prevalence of diagnosed
diabetes by race/ethnicity group and sex for U.S. adults); see also Donald J. Alcendor, Racial
Disparities—Associated COVID-19 Mortality Among Minority Populations in the US, 9 J.
CLINICAL MED. 2442 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7466083/
[https://perma.cc/R5T9-2BYW].
167. See generally Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 31 (discussing “social determinants of
health”).
168. Id. at 762.
169. Id. at 786.
170. See, e.g., Baum et al., supra note 2, at 10–11; Tong, supra note 110, at 225–26; Blake
et al., supra note 113, at 216–17. Antidiscrimination protections and paid leave have frequently
been discussed in the context of protections for people who are infected, but not for those seeking
to shield themselves or their housemates from infection. See, e.g., BELLAGIO GRP., supra note 1
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health measures, longstanding rules of employment and antidiscrimination
law have been significant contributors to the harms of the coronavirus
pandemic—and can be expected to be even more significant as we move
forward. The reason is that these bodies of law focus heavily on responsibility
and fault—of both workers and employers. Legal actors worry about
requiring employers to pay in the absence of fault or responsibility for the
harms workers experience. At the same time, they worry that too much
cushioning of workers’ burdens will promote irresponsible conduct (which
policymakers often call “moral hazard” 171). They do so even when applying
those employment and antidiscrimination doctrines that purport to abjure any
inquiry into responsibility or fault.
The result is to undermine both the fairness and the effectiveness of public
health measures. Employment and antidiscrimination law could provide a key
source of protections and public supports to enable people to abide by public
health recommendations and cope with resulting disruptions. As currently
framed and applied, though, these areas of law are better poised to exacerbate
a public health crisis than to mitigate it.
A. The Failure To Ensure Safe Working Conditions and Compensate
Workers for Harm
Employment law frequently focuses on attributing responsibility or fault
to the employer. It tries to relieve employers of having to bear costs for which
they aren’t deemed responsible. It does so by treating some costs or burdens
as the fault or responsibility of the individual employee and by treating other
costs or burdens as the responsibility of society in general. This is true not
just of individual employment law but also of employment discrimination
law. And it is true to a large extent even of those bodies of employment
regulation that were designed as a move away from the fault-based paradigm
of tort law.
This focus on responsibility or fault severely limits the protections that
employment law provides. Those limits are particularly apparent in the
application of the law to workers affected by the coronavirus pandemic. Both
because an employee’s particular vulnerability to COVID-19 is not
(“Planning and response should facilitate public involvement in surveillance and reporting of
possible cases without fear of discrimination, reprisal or uncompensated loss of livelihood.
Recognizing their vulnerability, special efforts are needed to foster reporting by disadvantaged
groups, as well as to protect them from negative impacts which could worsen their situation.”).
171. For an important critique of the concept of “moral hazard,” which informs our
discussion throughout, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237
(1996).
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something the law treats as the employer’s fault, and because the law aims to
prevent the “moral hazard” of workers taking advantage of the system, the
protections available to the most vulnerable workers are likely to be meager.
The problem would not be so great if the law called upon the public at large—
through government programs financed by taxation—to cushion the blow.
But it does not do so.
1.

Workplace Safety Regulation

When governors across the country closed most businesses, they did so
out of recognition that the workplace is likely to be a key locale in which
SARS-CoV-2 can spread.172 Even as businesses have reopened, the
significant risks remain.173 Certain types of workplaces—nursing homes,
other congregate residential facilities, and meatpacking plants—have been
especially notable for their contribution to the outbreaks we have
experienced.174 Those businesses are, by and large, staffed by unusually
172. See,
e.g.,
Minn.
Exec.
Order
No.
20-04
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/execorders/20-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NU8-VTJW]
(“[P]ublic accommodations in which Minnesotans congregate pose a threat to the public health
by providing environments for the spread of COVID-19.”); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-09
(Rescinded) (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705521789--,00.html [https://perma.cc/6V3P-ANCA] (“To mitigate the spread of COVID-19 . . . it
is reasonable and necessary to impose limited and temporary restrictions on the use of places of
public accommodation,” “mean[ing] a business . . . of any kind . . . available to the public.”); N.H.
Exec. Order No. 2020-04 (Emergency Order No. 17) (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt336/files/documents/emergency-order-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73VT-LZZS] (closing nonessential businesses to prevent community transfer);
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.4 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-2024continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disaster-emergency
[https://perma.cc/LRQ7-556V]; N.J. Exec. Order No. 107 (Mar. 21 2020),
https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-107.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCQ3-3JVM]; see also
Safe
Workplace
Rules
for
Essential
Employers,
CT.GOV,
https://portal.ct.gov/DECD/Content/Coronavirus-Business-Recovery/Safe-Workplace-Rulesfor-Essential-Employers [https://perma.cc/H465-TP8C] (“Essential employees who are able to
work from home SHOULD BE WORKING FROM HOME.”).
173. Rick Rojas & Melina Delkic, As States Reopen, Governors Balance Existing Risks with
New Ones, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/17/us/coronavirusstates-reopen.html [https://perma.cc/C96B-8RB8].
174. See Waltenburg et al., supra note 16, at 887; Wallace et al., supra note 16, at 594–96;
German Lopez, Why US Jails and Prisons Became Coronavirus Epicenters, VOX (Apr. 22, 2020,
12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/22/21228146/coronavirus-pandemic-jails-prisonsepicenters [https://perma.cc/GHV5-TSFU]; Amy Maxmen, Coronavirus Is Spreading Under the
Radar
in
US
Homeless
Shelters,
NATURE
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01389-3 [https://perma.cc/ZRM5-PD2E]; Eric
Schlosser, America’s Slaughterhouses Aren’t Just Killing Animals, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2020),
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disempowered workers who must do their jobs in very close proximity to
other people and often in unsanitary conditions.175
The continuing risks of workplace transmission create a number of issues.
For one thing, what must employers do to protect their workers? This is a
concern that might affect all workers—both those who are particularly
vulnerable to COVID-19 due to age or chronic illness and those without such
condition (who still face a significant risk of severe illness or death if
infected). Does the employer have an obligation to ensure that social
distancing measures, mask-wearing, or other procedures to reduce the spread
of the virus are carried out in the workplace? And what must an employer do
to ensure that those procedures do not place too great a burden on nonemployees (such as vendors or customers) who are especially at risk?
The area of law that is most relevant here is the body of workplace-safety
regulation and particularly the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act).176 The OSH Act declares a federal “purpose and policy . . . to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions.”177 The statute requires employers to
comply with standards issued by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA).178 Through what is known as its “general duty”
clause, the Act also imposes on each employer the obligation to “furnish to
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees.” 179
Although these provisions could theoretically require employers to take
meaningful steps to mitigate workplace transmission of SARS-CoV-2, there
are several reasons to doubt they will be effective in that regard. One reason
has to do with the difficult fit between the OSH Act’s regime and the
problems posed by communicable diseases. As Professor Paula Berg
explains, OSHA “catapulted itself into a dominant position in this field when
it interpreted its statutory obligation to regulate workplace toxins and
hazardous conditions” during the height of the AIDS crisis “to include
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/essentials-meatpeackingcoronavirus/611437/ [https://perma.cc/CU9W-7H8N]; Karen Yourish, K.K. Rebecca Lai,
Danielle Ivory & Mitch Smith, One-Third of All U.S. Coronavirus Deaths Are Nursing Home
Residents
or
Workers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
11,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/09/us/coronavirus-cases-nursing-homes-us.html
[https://perma.cc/5JDV-XVCP].
175. See supra text accompanying notes 154–163.
176. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78.
177. Id. § 651(b).
178. Id. § 654(a)(2).
179. Id. § 654(a)(1).
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disease-causing microbes carried by human beings.” 180 Though there is no
doubt that the OSH Act’s language reaches workplace health risks caused by
communicable diseases, Berg is correct that the statutory scheme was crafted
with other hazards in mind. Notably, the statute targeted “the increasing
incidence of industrial accidents and work-related disease caused by nonhuman workplace hazards, specifically dangerous equipment, harmful
physical agents, and toxic substances, many of which were associated with
new technologies.”181 That history matters, because the risks associated with
communicable disease “implicate[ ] a substantially broader and more
complex constellation of rights and interests” than do “non-human workplace
hazards.”182 Communicable diseases involve not just the balancing of
workers’ interests in protection against employers’ economic costs and
managerial prerogatives but also “the civil rights and liberties” of those who
have, or are perceived to have, such diseases, as well as “the general public’s
right to be protected against an unreasonable risk of contagion.” 183
The OSH Act’s structure seems to mandate that employers favor the
interests of employees over non-employees. 184 The result may be to promote
needless intrusions on the privacy interests of customers or vendors who are
perceived to be at risk of transmitting the virus. 185 Or it may even promote
outright exclusion of those customers or vendors—even where the risk is in
fact low.186 People with pre-existing conditions that make them particularly
vulnerable—or make them seem to be particularly vulnerable—to COVID19 may thus face additional and unnecessary burdens. And, as we
demonstrate below, the disability discrimination laws do not effectively
shield those individuals from such burdens. 187
But the statute is also unlikely to provide much protection to workers, even
in those industries where transmission appears to be particularly likely. There
180. Paula E. Berg, When the Hazard Is Human: Irrationality, Inequity, and Unintended
Consequences in Federal Regulation of Contagion, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1367, 1368–69 (1997).
181. Id. at 1370 (footnotes omitted).
182. Id. at 1371.
183. Id. at 1371–72 (footnotes omitted).
184. See id. at 1391–92.
185. See id. at 1390–93 (noting that OSHA’s bloodborne pathogens and tuberculosis
standards intruded on the privacy interests of customers in order to protect workers, even though
less intrusive approaches would have also ensured workplace safety).
186. See id. at 1391–93 (noting that OSHA’s proposed tuberculosis standard encouraged
employers to exclude customers or vendors with merely suspected TB).
187. See infra Part II.B.1. Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Americans with
Disabilities Act to protect employers against liability when they rely on a federal safety regulation.
See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577 (1999). The result is that OSHA
regulations may affirmatively promote harm to workers, vendors, and customers whose
disabilities make them vulnerable to COVID-19 infection. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1506–07 (2001).
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are several reasons. For one thing, although OSHA has issued guidance on
how employers should mitigate the risk of coronavirus transmission, 188 along
with interim enforcement guidance to its staff,189 it has not adopted any
specific standards governing the steps employers should take to protect
workers from SARS-CoV-2 infection—or infectious-disease risks
generally.190 In the wake of the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009, the AFLCIO and several other labor organizations filed a petition with the agency for
a standard protecting workers against infectious diseases. 191 Although OSHA
began the standards-setting process in response to that petition, the agency
put the matter on the back burner in 2017.192 In response to the coronavirus
pandemic, the AFL-CIO and National Nurses United asked the agency to
adopt an “emergency temporary standard” addressing COVID-19. 193 But
188. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 143.
189. Memorandum from Lee Anne Jillings, Acting Dir., Directorate of Tech. Support and
Emergency Mgmt. & Patrick J. Kapust, Acting Dir., Directorate of Enf’t Programs to Reg’l
Adm’rs & State Plan Designees (May 19, 2020), https://www.osha.gov/memos/2020-0519/revised-enforcement-guidance-recording-cases-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/D98W-9SMQ] (providing an “updated interim guidance,” effective May 26,
2020).
190. SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND COVID19, at 7 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46288 [https://perma.cc/W92FL3ED] (“Currently, no OSHA standard directly covers exposure to airborne or aerosol diseases
in the workplace.”).
191. Unions Press OSHA To Enforce Swine Flu Protections (5/21), INDUS. SAFETY &
HYGIENE NEWS (May 21, 2009), https://www.ishn.com/articles/88387-unions-press-osha-toenforce-swine-flu-protections-5-21 [https://perma.cc/6NJH-ANJN].
192. See Emily Schwing, How OSHA Has Failed To Protect America’s Workers from
COVID-19, GOV’T EXEC. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2020/04/howosha-has-failed-protect-americas-workers-covid-19/164382/
[https://perma.cc/T7JV-HFDL]
(noting that the Obama Administration had begun “a formal regulatory effort” to set an infectious
disease standard in 2010, but that the Trump Administration shelved the effort in 2017). Such
long delays in the promulgation of standards are a persistent problem for the agency. For a general
discussion of the problem, see Time Takes Its Toll: Delays in OSHA’s Standard-Setting Process
and the Impact on Worker Safety: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. &
Pensions, 112th Cong. 725 (2012); see also John Howard, OSHA Standards-Setting: Past Glory,
Present Reality and Future Hope, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 237, 238 (2010) (“Using the
Act’s broad statutory authorities granted to the Secretary, OSHA adopted the majority of its
current standards for toxic chemical and physical agents in the 1970s. The 1970s ‘period of glory’
passed quickly though. Beginning in early 1980s, the flow of OSHA health standards-setting
slowed considerably. By 2010, the flow could charitably be described as a trickle.”).
193. Letter from Richard L. Trumka, President, Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs.,
to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://aflcio.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/FINAL%20AFLCIO_Petition%20COVID-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6YW-K7SW]; Letter from Bonnie Castillo, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Nurses United,
to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. & Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant
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OSHA still has not acted, and the D.C. Circuit denied mandamus to force it
to act.194
The lack of a specific standard is a big deal because the enforcement of
such standards is the principal means by which the agency can affect
workplace practices. The OSH Act’s general duty clause provides a residual
mechanism to act in the absence of specific standards, but “courts have
consistently held that standards are the preferred enforcement mechanism.” 195
They thus impose a “heightened standard of proof” on the agency in general
duty clause litigation.196 They require the agency to “prove the feasibility of
abatement measures” for each targeted employer, one at a time. 197 And they
give employers ample opportunity, in each case, to “disput[e] the scientific
basis” for the agency’s action.198 These hurdles ensure that general duty
clause litigation will be “initiated too infrequently to create long-lasting
incentives.”199
Indeed, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC)—the administrative agency that adjudicates OSH Act violations—
has recently expressed great skepticism about OSHA’s reliance on the
general duty clause. Rejecting a general duty claim involving the exposure of
workers to dangerously excessive heat, the Commission offered its view that
the clause “seems to have increasingly become more of a ‘gotcha’ and ‘catch
all’ for the agency to utilize, which as a practical matter often leaves
employers confused as to what is required of them.”200 Referring to a prior
case in which OSHA had relied on the general duty clause to challenge
workplace exposure to a carcinogen, the Commission expressed a preference
for the standard-setting process because “in a rulemaking proceeding, all
interested parties have the opportunity to be heard, and a rule gives employers
notice of what they must do to provide safe and healthful workplaces.” 201
In a concurring opinion, then-Chair Heather MacDougall compared the
case to others in which, she suggested, the agency had sought to “stretch” the

Sec’y of Lab. for Occupational Safety & Health, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. (Mar. 4,
2020),
https://act.nationalnursesunited.org/page//files/graphics/NNUPetitionOSHA03042020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGQ6-R58H].
194. See In re Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., No. 20-1158, 2020 WL 3125324,
at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2020).
195. Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1199 (5th Cir. 1997).
196. Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory
and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 134 n.184 (2000).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. A.H. Sturgill Roofing, Inc., 2019 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,712 (No. 13-0224, 2019).
201. Id. (quoting Kastalon, Inc., 1986 CCH OSHD ¶ 27,643 (No. 79-5543, 1986)).
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general duty clause.202 And she said that employers cannot be expected, under
that clause, to “analyz[e] personal risk factors” of particular employees. 203 A
“single employee’s unique susceptibility to heat illness,” she concluded,
“cannot be sufficient to establish the existence of an ‘excessive heat’
hazard.”204 If that analysis were applied to workplace transmission of SARSCoV-2—where different employees face different levels of risk based on
their “idiosyncratic underlying health conditions”205—it would be very
difficult for OSHA to deploy the general duty clause as a meaningful tool.
The problems with relying on the general duty clause are compounded by
the severe resource constraints OSHA faces—constraints that have ensured
that the OSH Act is massively underenforced. As the National Employment
Law Project recently reported, OSHA “is not doing on-site enforcement and
has no COVID-19-specific mandates for employers.” 206 The agency “has a
total of 862 inspectors to cover millions of workplaces”—the lowest number
of inspectors in forty-five years.207 But even before the Trump
Administration, scholars had long observed that “[t]he combination of rare
inspections and typically modest penalties creates a predictable incentive on
the part of employers to ignore health and safety requirements that impose
costs.”208
All told, the OSH Act is unlikely to provide effective protection against
workplace risks of coronavirus infection—particularly for employees in the
most vulnerable groups. And this is directly connected to the fault and
responsibility focus of employment law generally. We can see the connection
most directly in the application of the general duty clause, where the test for
finding an employer violation looks a lot like a negligence standard. The D.C.
Circuit recently described the governing law this way: “The General Duty
Clause inquires not how an employer’s accident rate compares with its own
202. See id. (MacDougall, Chairman, concurring) (first citing Mo. Basin Well Serv., Inc.,
2018 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,648 (No. 13-1817, 2018); then citing Mid S. Waffles, Inc., 2019 CCH
OSHD ¶ 33,708 (No. 13-1022, 2019) (MacDougall, Chairman, concurring); and then citing
Pelron Corp., 1986 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 27,605 (No. 82-388, 1986)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. Note that, in Sturgill Roofing, the employee’s “idiosyncratic” health conditions were
hepatitis C and heart disease.
206. Deborah Berkowitz, Worker Safety in Crisis: The Cost of a Weakened OSHA, NAT’L
EMP. L. PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nelp.org/publication/worker-safety-crisis-costweakened-osha/ [https://perma.cc/UKM6-TXSZ].
207. Id.
208. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 330 (2005); see also Christine Jolls, Law and the Labor Market, 2 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 359, 368 (2006) (noting that “[i]n light of the low financial penalties for the
typical OSHA violation and the low likelihood of OSHA inspections, many have questioned
whether OSHA is likely to have any effect on workplace safety at all” (citations omitted)).
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history or industry averages, but whether ‘a reasonably prudent employer
familiar with the circumstances of the industry would have protected against
the hazard in the manner specified by the Secretary’s citation.’”209 The recent
OSHRC decisions seeking to protect employers against “gotcha” applications
of the clause also reflect an unwillingness to impose liability in the absence
of fault. And former Chair MacDougall’s suggestion that employers cannot
be held liable for injuries related to the “personal risk factors” of individual
workers similarly suggests a decision to allocate to those individual workers
the responsibility for avoiding such injuries.210
Resistance to workplace safety regulation has long rested on the notion
that it is up to individual workers to decide whether to avoid risky jobs. 211
That resistance has led to the persistent underfunding of OSHA and the
agency’s many delays in issuing standards. Both at the level of doctrine and
at the level of politics, then, the fault/responsibility paradigm has constrained
occupational safety and health law in a way that makes it unlikely to protect
workers who are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19.
2.

Workers’ Compensation

Many scholars who believe that the OSH Act tilts too far in favor of
command-and-control regulation argue that workers’ compensation gives
employers an adequate incentive to optimize the risks their workplaces

209. BHC Nw. Psychiatric Hosp., LLC v. Sec’y of Lab., 951 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quoting SeaWorld of Fla., LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
210. See A.H. Sturgill Roofing, Inc., 2019 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,712 (No. 13-0224, 2019)
(MacDougall, Chairman, concurring).
211. See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF
MARKETS 291 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1999) (1997) (“In the debates leading up to OSHA, industry
representatives and their academic allies repeatedly made the argument that, if actual workers
wanted higher levels of health and safety, their representatives would have made safety a higher
priority in collective bargaining. . . . Therefore, it was professional do-gooders and not workers
themselves who were agitating for unrealistically risk-free workplaces.”). Proponents of marketbased solutions who favor deregulation assume that “[w]orkers will seek safer jobs unless
employers compensate them for workplace risks.” Sidney A. Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 23 (1999); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING
HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 1 (1983) (“These market-traded [workplace] risks are
the result of individual choices . . . .”). For reasons to doubt that workers are actually in a position
to negotiate efficient risk premiums—even if efficiency were our only goal here—see T HOMAS
O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 18–20 (1993) and Alison Morantz et al.,
Economic Incentives in Workers’ Compensation: A Holistic, International Perspective, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1015, 1021–22, 1032–35 (2017).
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impose on employees.212 One might, therefore, expect workers’
compensation to solve the problem even if direct regulation does not.
But workers’ compensation does a notoriously poor job of responding to
diseases (as opposed to injuries) linked to the workplace. One leading review
finds “no question that most occupational diseases are never compensated”
under the program.213 Studies show that only a relatively small percentage of
workers with occupational diseases receive compensation—although
estimates of the percentage vary.214 Cases in which a workplace exposure
arguably aggravated an employee’s “preexisting health conditions”—as, for
example, when a worker with diabetes faces an elevated risk of developing a
severe case of COVID-19—face significant barriers to coverage and payment
under state workers’ compensation systems.215
The reasons stem from the application of “[t]he central test for determining
compensability in workers’ compensation”: The injury or illness must be one
“arising out of and in the course of employment.”216 It may be difficult for
employees to show that they contracted a disease at work—“particularly
when the disease also commonly occurs outside workplaces.” 217 And recent
changes to workers’ compensation laws in many states have made the
problem worse. Where employers were once required to take employees “as
they found them,” workers are increasingly required “to demonstrate that the
workplace event was the ‘major contributing cause’ or the ‘predominant
cause’—or equivalent language—of the disability.”218 These rules will pose
major barriers to those who develop COVID-19. Those workers will be
required to prove that they acquired the disease at the workplace, and that
some pre-existing condition was not the major cause for the seriousness of
their illness.
Once again, this result stems directly from the fault/responsibility
paradigm that drives employment law rules. This may seem a bit surprising.
After all, the “grand bargain” of workers’ compensation was supposed to
remove fault from the equation. The whole point was to compensate for the
212. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB
RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 3 (1990).
213. See Emily A. Spieler & John F. Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between WorkRelated Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Beneﬁts, 55 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 487,
499 (2012).
214. See id. at 493.
215. See Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work
Injuries in the United States, 1900–2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891, 997 (2017).
216. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,”
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 792 (1998).
217. See Spieler & Burton, supra note 213, at 499.
218. Spieler, supra note 215, at 938.
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“[m]any accidents” that “seemed to come from the inherent dangers of
work”—accidents for which “fault could not easily be assigned to either the
worker or employer.”219 In exchange for limitations on the amount of
recovery, “employees are covered for all workplace injuries without having
to prove employer fault.”220
Yet considerations of fault—on both the employer’s and the worker’s
part—creep back into the application of the system. Some states provide
explicit exclusions for accidents caused by worker misconduct. 221 The more
insidious invasion of fault, though, has occurred in the “arising out of and in
the course of” requirement. Reforms that have been designed to tighten up
that requirement appear on their face to rest on empirical judgments about
causation—on an effort to limit employers’ responsibility for those injuries
that were “really” caused by the workplace. However, “[c]ausation is not
simply a matter of fact, but is a complex social construction shaped by
political views.”222 Because “[a]ny injury or illness is an interaction between
a work environment and a human body (and mind) with the outcome
dependent on the characteristics of both,” the question of what illnesses we
treat as caused by the workplace “is not simply a question of science but of
distributive values.”223
As Professor Martha McCluskey extensively demonstrates, the reforms
that tightened the “arising out of and in the course of” requirement ultimately
rest on a “fault-like focus on workers as causes of injury.” 224 These reforms
219. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE:
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 3 (2000); see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC 126 (2004) (describing the essence of workers’ compensation as follows: “The fault of
the employer, the employee, or some fellow employee would be irrelevant, except where an
employee injured himself by his own intentional wrongful act”). Some commentators have long
recognized that the asserted rejection of fault-based liability in workers’ compensation is more
rhetoric than reality. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law
of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 71 (1967) (“In essence, then, workmen’s
compensation was designed to replace a highly unsatisfactory system with a rational, actuarial
one. It should not be viewed as the replacement of a fault-oriented compensation system with one
unconcerned with fault. It should not be viewed as a victory of employees over employers.”). But
the canonical story remains that the program adopts a no-fault system.
220. Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 838
(2017).
221. See id. at 838 n.120.
222. McCluskey, supra note 216, at 794; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 53 (1992)
(“[B]ecause judges and jurists inevitably imported moral ideas into their determinations of legal
causation, they were making discretionary policy determinations under the guise of doing
science.”).
223. McCluskey, supra note 216, at 795–96.
224. Id. at 799. On the connection between determinations of causation and of fault in tort
and workers’ compensation law, see WITT, supra note 219, at 168–70.
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sought “to reduce claimant moral hazard by restricting compensation for
losses perceived to result primarily from cost-increasing by workers rather
than from workplace harms or actual disability.” 225 They aimed to “weed[ ]
out claims for injuries to which workers’ lifestyle, skill levels, leisure
activities, age, preexisting health conditions, or job choice may have
contributed”; as a result, they effectively “reintroduce employers’ nineteenthcentury fault-based defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, to some extent.”226 But these rules do not eliminate moral hazard so
much as “redistribut[e]” it to employers, who can pass off the costs of
accidents on workers or society at large.227
3.

Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects workers against race
discrimination by their employers.228 It is not common to think of Title VII as
a workplace safety statute.229 But there seems to be a strong reason to believe
that some jobs that present especially significant risks of coronavirus
infection are disproportionately held by women and people of color. As
Ruqaiijah Yearby and Seema Mohapatra show, some of the workers at
greatest risk are “those working in home health care and in the meat
processing industry.”230 Fully “[n]inety percent of home health care workers
are women, and two-thirds of them are women of color.”231 And “[m]ore than
half of workers in the US who work in meat processing are people of color”—

225. Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 851 (2003). As Witt shows, similar concerns drove
initial opposition to the adoption of workers’ compensation schemes. See WITT, supra note 219,
at 172.
226. McCluskey, supra note 225, at 851.
227. Id. at 853. Here, McCluskey’s argument follows that of the early twentieth-century
Legal Realists. See Bagenstos, supra note 56, at 422–29. For an example of case law influenced
by the Legal Realists on this point, see W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937)
(“The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining
power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only
detrimental to their health and well being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay.”).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
229. Claims that an employer intentionally assigned workers to more dangerous jobs based
on their race are not, of course, unheard of. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL
339, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973) (employer assigned Black employees to “hard and dangerous”
tasks from which it excused similarly situated white employees), aff’d and remanded, 522 F.2d
1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
230. Yearby & Mohapatra, supra note 17.
231. Id.

52:1235]

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY PANDEMIC

1277

most of whom are immigrants.232 If people in these vulnerable positions must
work in unsafe conditions or are denied adequate personal protective
equipment—both of which seem to be the case in many workplaces 233—
might Title VII be a basis for them to force their employers to respond?
Unfortunately, there are substantial barriers to successful Title VII
litigation in this context. And these barriers stem from the same
individualistic fault/responsibility paradigm.234 Unless workers can show that
the racial or gender composition of an especially risky job classification
results from intentional discrimination by a particular employer, they will be
unable to establish disparate-treatment discrimination.235 If that composition
results from broader forms of systemic social subordination, courts are
unlikely to conclude that the employer discriminated vis-à-vis a similarly
situated comparator.236 They will instead determine that society at large—
rather than any particular employer—is responsible for any disparity that
results.237
A similar problem is likely to confront disparate-impact litigation. One
might argue that, given the disproportionate representation of people of color
in some high-risk jobs, unsafe conditions in those jobs necessarily cause a
disparate impact on the basis of race. Absent a selection criterion that
disproportionately directs members of certain racial or ethnic groups into
those jobs, however, courts will say that the employer did not “use[ ] a
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., id. For recent litigation involving conditions in meatpacking facilities, see
Notice of Removal, Benjamin v. JBS S.A., No. 2:20-cv-02594 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2020), 2020 WL
2893505; Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Parra v. Quality Sausage Co., No. DC-20-06406 (Dist. Ct.
Tex. Apr. 30, 2020), 2020 WL 2231332; Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459
F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1240–41 (W.D. Mo. 2020). For recent litigation involving farmworkers, see
Castillo v. Whitmer, 823 F. App’x 413 (6th Cir. 2020).
234. See Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 31, at 788–89 (discussing the “individualist bias”
evident in judicial interpretations of Title VII).
235. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“Disparate-treatment cases
present ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination,’ and occur where an employer has
‘treated [a] particular person less favorably than others because of’ a protected trait. A disparatetreatment plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive’ for
taking a job-related action.” (citations omitted)).
236. Compare Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973),
aff’d and remanded, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975), in which the employer treated similarly
situated Black and white employees differently. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix
from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 193 (2009) (“The
reality on the ground is that discrimination cases today increasingly turn not on whether the
plaintiff has proven her prima facie case or established that the ‘legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason’ is a pretext for discrimination (although the courts continue to invoke the McDonnell
Douglas mantra), but rather on whether the plaintiff has identified a suitable ‘comparator’ who
was treated more favorably than she.”).
237. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 57, at 43–45.
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particular employment practice that cause[d] a disparate impact” as required
for liability under the statute.238 Again, the courts will effectively determine
that any disparities are the responsibility of society, not the particular
employer. And even if workers could show that the employer was responsible
for a disparate impact, the employer would still escape liability if it could
show that the challenged practice was “job related” and “consistent with
business necessity.”239 Where a practice leads to demonstrable cost savings,
courts tend to say that the business-necessity test is satisfied. 240 This doctrine,
too, rests on the premise that employers are responsible for their own
enterprises’ success, and that requiring them to assume too great a cost
burden improperly forces them to shoulder a burden that society in general
should bear.241
B. The Failure To Protect Those Who Cannot or Should Not Work
Some workers should stay home. Some should stay home for short
durations while they pose a risk of infection to others. Others should stay
home for longer durations because it is not safe for them to work or because
they have obligations to care for others. If the law does not ensure that those
individuals can stay home while receiving pay and benefits, they will face a
deadly dilemma—unable to work without risking life and health, but unable
to avoid work without risking their livelihood and health insurance.
Unfortunately, the law does not provide these protections.
1.

The ADA and FMLA

If it is temporarily unsafe for an employee to work due to age or chronic
conditions that make them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, a paid leave
would provide a way out of the deadly dilemma. A temporary paid leave for
individuals who are likely to transmit SARS-CoV-2 during the period of
recommended quarantine and isolation could also help protect coworkers,
customers, and the communities in which they live. And paid caregiving
leave would assist those whose family members or dependents are
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Disparate impact litigation under Title VII has
generally been successful only in challenges to job selection criteria. See Bagenstos, Structural
Turn, supra note 57, at 23–24; Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 701, 733–34 (2006).
239. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
240. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 605 v. Miss. Power &
Light Co., 442 F.3d 313, 319 (5th Cir. 2006).
241. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 57, at 43–45.
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particularly vulnerable or are forced to stay home from school or child care
due to public health mitigation measures.
Although there are two general federal statutes that require employers to
provide leave related to health conditions in some circumstances, they do not
solve the problem—both because their coverage is limited and because they
do not mandate paid leave. A few states require employers to provide paid
sick leave, but coverage is limited even there. And Congress created a special
COVID-19 paid leave program in the Families First Coronavirus Response
Act, but the program is merely temporary and leaves out around half of
affected workers.
Begin with the general federal statutes: the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The ADA
mandates that employers provide “reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business.”242 The lower federal courts have repeatedly
recognized that granting “some amount of leave” to a disabled employee
“may be a reasonable accommodation, at least in some circumstances.” 243
Because virtually any underlying health impairment that results in a risk of
acquiring a deadly disease will constitute a protected “disability” under the
ADA Amendments Act,244 the ADA’s accommodation requirement looks
initially promising as a source of a right to temporary leave for those workers
who are most at risk.245
242. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
243. Stacy A. Hickox & Joseph M. Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation: When Is Enough,
Enough?, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 444 (2014).
244. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, sec. 4, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
245. The accommodation requirement could also provide leverage for especially vulnerable
workers to force their employers to provide them safer conditions—whether by providing them
special protective equipment, by changing work schedules to avoid times of contact with others,
by allowing them to work from home, by transferring them to less risky positions, or otherwise,
so long as the accommodation does not impose an undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)
(defining the term “reasonable accommodation” to include, inter alia, “job restructuring, parttime or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, [and] acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices”). Although early post-ADA decisions seemed to rule out
work-from-home accommodations, recent cases have expressed more willingness to find them
reasonable. See, e.g., Bilinsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). For a
concrete discussion of what accommodations like this might look like in response to COVID-19,
see Samuel Bagenstos, Accommodating Medical Professionals with Pre-Existing Health
Conditions
in
the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
JUST SEC.
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/70050/accommodating-medical-professionals-with-pre-existinghealth-conditions-in-the-coronavirus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/6KS4-EGPE].
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But there are three key problems with relying on the ADA here. First, the
statute’s accommodation requirement is limited to disabilities of the
employee.246 To the extent that a worker seeks leave or other accommodations
because of the particular vulnerability of a spouse or child, the ADA will
provide no remedy. The statute prohibits employers from “excluding or
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of
the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is
known to have a relationship or association.” 247 But that prohibition on
associational discrimination has been held not to require accommodation of
a nondisabled employee based on that employee’s association with an
individual with a disability.248
The second problem is even more significant. Although courts have
recognized in general that leave can be a reasonable accommodation, they
have resisted requiring employers to provide leaves of absence that are
indefinite or too long (though they have mostly been unclear as to how long
is too long).249 A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, for example,
recognized that “[i]ntermittent time off or a short leave of absence—say, a
couple of days or even a couple of weeks—may, in appropriate
circumstances, be” a reasonable accommodation. 250 The court went on to say,
however, that the ADA could not be read to require “a medical leave spanning
multiple months.”251
And the third problem is the most important of all. Even where the ADA
requires an employer to provide leave to a worker with a disability, it will
require only unpaid leave.252 If we want to ensure that individuals are not put
to the dilemma of risking their lives and health by going to work, or risking
their livelihoods and health insurance by staying home, paid leave is
necessary. As it has been interpreted by the EEOC and the courts, the ADA
simply does not address the problem.
These limitations stem directly from the fault/responsibility paradigm. As
one of us has shown, the EEOC and the courts have long interpreted the
246. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
247. Id. § 12112(b)(4).
248. See, e.g., Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1084–85 (10th Cir. 1997); see
also Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Association Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Another Uphill Battle for Potential ADA Plaintiffs, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 132, 169
(2004) (“Although the ADA requires employers to accommodate individuals with disabilities as
long as such an accommodation would not present an undue hardship on the employer, the
association provision of the ADA has no such requirement.”) (footnotes omitted)).
249. See Hickox & Guzman, supra note 243, at 452–63.
250. Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Molly Weston Williamson, The Meaning of Leave: Understanding Workplace
Leave Rights, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 197, 254 (2019).
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ADA’s open-ended “reasonable accommodation” language in a way that
protects employers against being forced to engage in “ad hoc wealth
redistribution to individuals with disabilities.”253 The courts have especially
sought to protect businesses against being forced “to bear a financial burden
not because of any particular fault on [their] part, but simply because of the
fortuity that this particular worker with a disability applied for one of [their]
positions.”254 The refusal to require employers to provide extended or paid
leaves rests on the same understanding that individual firms “can be held
responsible for their ‘own’ choices but cannot be required to make up for
broader failures of social provision.”255
The FMLA plainly requires covered employers to provide covered
workers with twelve weeks’ leave for their own or their family members’
“serious health condition[s].”256 But the statute covers only relatively large
employers (those with fifty or more employees), 257 and it covers only those
employees who have worked for their current employers for at least twelve
months and for at least 1,250 hours during that period.258 These limitations
deny FMLA protections to approximately 44% of private-sector
employees259—not to mention those workers who are classified as
independent contractors. And even where it does apply, the statute requires
employers to grant only unpaid leave.260 Like the ADA, then, the FMLA
continues to leave vulnerable workers on the horns of a deadly dilemma. 261
Congress seemed to recognize the need for leave when it adopted the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).262 That statute added a
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Bagenstos, Future of Disability Law, supra note 57, at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)–(D).
Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
Id. § 2611(2)(A).
HELENE JORGENSEN & EILEEN APPELBAUM, EXPANDING FEDERAL FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE COVERAGE: WHO BENEFITS FROM CHANGES IN ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS? 1
(2014), https://cepr.net/documents/fmla-eligibility-2014-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5ZP-SXT4].
260. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs:
Universalism and Reproductive Justice, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES (Melissa
Murray, Kate Shaw & Reva Siegel eds., 2019) (highlighting the lack of an entitlement to paid
leave as a significant limitation of the FMLA).
261. A handful of states and localities have adopted paid family or sick leave requirements.
See generally Paid Family and Sick Leave in the U.S., KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/paid-family-leave-and-sick-days-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/H3CQ-QRLP]. Even in jurisdictions where these mandates exist, however,
their coverage is sufficiently uneven (and the number of required leave days sufficiently small)
that they are no substitute for a meaningful federal leave mandate in response to a threat like the
coronavirus.
262. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
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temporary mandate that employers provide paid leave in a variety of
circumstances: two weeks’ fully paid leave to employees who are unable to
work because they are quarantined or have COVID-19 symptoms, two
weeks’ leave at two-thirds of the worker’s normal rate of pay to employees
who must care for individuals who are quarantined or have COVID-19
symptoms, and twelve weeks’ leave at two-thirds of the worker’s normal rate
of pay to employees who must care for children whose schools or child care
providers are closed due to the pandemic.263 Employers were to be
compensated with dollar-for-dollar tax credits. 264 But that mandate expired at
the end of 2020—though Congress extended the tax credit through March of
2021 for those employers who decided voluntarily to continue to provide
leave.265 And “a majority of the workforce [wa]sn’t eligible for the benefits”
in any event, because Congress and the Trump Administration exempted
employees for both large and small employers, as well as many front-line
workers.266 Two researchers for the Kaiser Family Foundation concluded that
the limitations on the receipt of paid leave under the FFCRA will impose a
disproportionate burden on already-disempowered employees: Fully 75% of
the potentially excluded workers are women, 39% are people of color, and
“18% are low-wage, for whom having to take unpaid leave when they are
sick could put them in a difficult financial situation.”267

263. See id. § 5102(a), 134 Stat. at 195–96.
264. See id. § 7001, 134 Stat. at 210–12; id. § 7003, 134 Stat. at 214–17.
265. See Evandro Gigante, Harris Mufson, Alex Downie & Abigail Rosenblum, Congress
Extends FFCRA Tax Credit into 2021, Declines to Extend FFCRA Leave, LAW & THE
WORKPLACE (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.lawandtheworkplace.com/2020/12/congress-extendsffcra-tax-credit-into-2021-declines-to-extend-ffcra-leave/ [https://perma.cc/2JQ4-X9QM].
266. Ben Penn, Paid-Leave Promise Turns ‘Mirage’ for Most Workers in Pandemic,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 27, 2020, 3:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/paid-leave-promise-turns-mirage-for-most-workers-in-pandemic?context=article-related
[https://perma.cc/R8M9-Q7LQ]; see Michelle Long & Matthew Rae, Gaps in the Emergency
Paid Sick Leave Law for Health Care Workers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 17, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/gaps-in-emergency-paid-sick-leave-lawfor-health-care-workers/ [https://perma.cc/5LPT-TZST] (estimating “that at least 69.4 million
workers, or approximately four in ten workers, are potentially ineligible for emergency paid sick
leave benefits”). For the specific provisions limiting availability, see § 110(a)(3)(B), 134 Stat. at
190; id. § 5110(2)(b)(i)(I), 134 Stat. at 199; id. § 5111(1)–(2), 134 Stat. at 201; Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1110(a)(2), 134 Stat. 181,
306–07 (2020); Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 80 Fed. Reg.
19326 (proposed Apr. 2, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826).
267. Long & Rae, supra note 266 (footnote omitted).
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Unemployment and Disability Insurance

If people cannot or should not work because of their illness or their
particular vulnerability to illness, and if it is not fair to employers to make
them pay, it seems straightforward to socialize the cost, so that the burdens
of mitigation measures are shared by those who benefit from those measures.
Yet the relevant government programs do not do this. Again, this result stems
from concern about fault and responsibility. Here, as with workers’
compensation law, that concern is instantiated as a fear of workers’ “moral
hazard.”
a. Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance (UI) is our nation’s primary means of protecting
workers against the harshest consequences of temporary economic
downturns.268 That program could, in theory, serve as the best protection
against the deadly dilemma described above by offering vulnerable “workers,
particularly low-wage workers, a viable alternative to being compelled to
work in a pandemic.”269 But several crucial aspects of the unemployment
insurance system limit its effectiveness as a protection in this context.
When it set up the system in the Social Security Act of 1935, Congress
deferred to older notions of federalism and provided that states should
administer the program.270 It gave individual states broad discretion to set
benefits above a very low federal floor.271 Employers finance the system
through “experience rated” premiums—the more claims are accepted against
a particular employer, the more that employer will be forced to pay to insure
its workers in the future.272 “To access UI, workers must meet state-specific
monetary eligibility requirements (based on prior earnings), meet non-

268. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Unemployment Compensation: Continuity, Change, and the
Prospects for Reform, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 2 (1996) (“Today’s unemployment
compensation system was designed as the answer to a particular question—how to maintain
income security and consumer purchasing power during economically induced short-term
unemployment.”).
269. Wesley Bignell & Marshall Steinbaum, A Way To Help Workers, Now and in the Future,
AM. PROSPECT (May 28, 2020), https://prospect.org/coronavirus/a-way-to-help-workers-nowand-in-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/2P3Y-UT69].
270. See Daniel N. Price, Unemployment Insurance, Then and Now, 1935–85, SOC. SEC.
BULL., Oct. 1985, at 23–24.
271. See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 335, 344 (2001).
272. Id. at 344–45.
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monetary requirements (based on the nature of an employment separation and
availability for future work) and navigate complex state bureaucracies.” 273
The structure of the program thus creates multiple incentives to
shortchange workers. To avoid high taxes that might drive businesses to less
generous jurisdictions, states have an incentive to reduce benefits. 274 In part
for this reason, “most American workers are residents of states with frail UI
systems and declining social protection.” 275 And employers have an incentive
to fight their workers’ claims and otherwise engage in “lawyering and
innovations in business processes that make benefits awards less likely,” so
that they may avoid higher premiums in the future. 276
The results have been predictable. States have imposed significant hurdles
to obtaining unemployment benefits in recent years. The Center for American
Progress reported in 2016 that “a growing number of states are disregarding
their obligations to operate fair and accessible UI programs, often by
constructing complex automated claims-filing systems and overly stringent
documentation requirements”—with the effect of “discouraging eligible
workers from initially applying for the benefits they have already earned” and

273. H. Luke Shaefer, Identifying Key Barriers to Unemployment Insurance for
Disadvantaged Workers in the United States, 39 J. SOC. POL’Y 439, 439 (2010).
274. See Brian Galle, How To Save Unemployment Insurance, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1009, 1031
(2018) (“The result is a race to the bottom. States that aim to offer generous UI benefits must fund
them, and risk driving out employers, triggering unemployment, which must be funded through
higher taxes on the remaining businesses.” (footnote omitted)); Lester, supra note 271, at 356
n.85 (“Interstate variation creates unfairness as well as a potential ‘race to the bottom’ as states
may succumb to competition for corporate investment by making UI obligations increasingly less
onerous for employers.”); Mashaw, supra note 268, at 10 (“[I]t is difficult, to say the least, for
states to move too far out in front of their fellow states whose response might be, not to follow
their lead, but to attempt to attract their industries.”); W ILL KIMBALL & RICK MCHUGH, HOW LOW
CAN WE GO? STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS EXCLUDE RECORD NUMBERS OF
JOBLESS WORKERS 12 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/how-low-can-we-go-stateunemployment-r3.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH2J-LLVU] (“Permitting states to operate restrictive UI
programs undercuts the goals of UI and creates competitive pressures on those states with decent
programs to engage in a ‘race to the bottom.’”).
275. Chang Yu-Ling, Unequal Social Protection Under the Federalist System: Three
Unemployment Insurance Approaches in the United States, 2007–2015, 49 J. SOC. POL’Y 189,
207 (2020). Chang found that less than one-third of states maintained both adequate social
protections and sufficient financing, see id., and that the states that provided inadequate social
protections “appeared to follow the logic of interstate competition by reducing the benefit level
when their benefits were more generous than their neighbouring states,” id. at 206.
276. Galle, supra note 274, at 1032; see Wayne Vroman & Stephen A. Woodbury, Financing
Unemployment Insurance, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 265 (2014) (noting that experience rating
“creates an incentive for employers to unfairly challenge the UI claims of their former employees,
so as to prevent increases in their tax rate”).
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“preventing workers from successfully submitting ongoing weekly
claims.”277
Although Congress temporarily expanded unemployment insurance in its
stimulus legislation,278 these administrative burdens significantly blunted the
impact of Congress’s action. The Economic Policy Institute estimates that
administrative burdens kept between 8.9 and 13.9 million people from filing
for unemployment insurance in the immediate wake of the coronavirus
pandemic.279 And as Professor Galle has explained, “Employers have grown
considerably more skilled and aggressive than in the past, resulting in more
workers being found ineligible or cut off from benefits before those benefits
expire.”280 That development is bound to affect workers who claim
unemployment during the pandemic.
The administrative burdens imposed by states were in part inspired by
concern about protecting employers against costs in the absence of fault. 281
They were also inspired by concerns about alleged moral hazard—that if it
were too easy for individuals to obtain unemployment benefits, people would
have too great an incentive not to return to work. 282 And some of the eligibility
277. RACHEL WEST ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STRENGTHENING UNEMPLOYMENT
PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA: MODERNIZING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND ESTABLISHING A
JOBSEEKER’S
ALLOWANCE
68
(2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/31134245/UI_JSAreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZAH-F2GZ]; see also
NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, ARE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS STILL ABLE TO COUNTER
RECESSIONS?
4–5 (2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Data-Brief-StateUnemployment-Systems-Counter-Recession.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S7Q-PAF3]. Perhaps the
most notorious example comes from Michigan, where then-Governor Rick “Snyder slashed the
Michigan [Unemployment Insurance Agency] staff by a third and implemented a host of rule
changes that made it harder for unemployed workers to get benefits. His initiatives include[d] the
now-infamous . . . automated system that levied false charges of fraud against more than 40,000
Michiganders.” Nancy Kaffer, Opinion, How Rick Snyder Made It Harder To Collect
Unemployment Benefits, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 15, 2020, 1:52 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-kaffer/2020/05/15/rick-snydermichigan-unemployment-fund-uia/5182208002/ [https://perma.cc/FA7V-9NGG].
278. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§§ 2101–16, 134 Stat. 181, 313–35 (2020).
279. Ben Zipperer & Elise Gould, Unemployment Filing Failures: New Survey Confirms that
Millions of Jobless Were Unable To File an Unemployment Insurance Claim, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Apr. 28, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-filing-failures-new-surveyconfirms-that-millions-of-jobless-were-unable-to-file-an-unemployment-insurance-claim/
[https://perma.cc/CL86-CHZD].
280. Galle, supra note 274, at 1025.
281. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 202 (1999) (“Employer economic incentives, resulting from experience
rating, clearly feed back into state coverage policies. Experience rating is therefore implicated in
both the current low levels of effective coverage and resistance to relaxing eligibility criteria to
qualify workers whose unemployment is not within the employer’s control.”).
282. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 274, at 1061.
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rules adopted by states aim directly at that supposed problem. Benefits are
generally available only to those who are “able and available” to work and
who did not voluntarily leave their previous positions.283 Economic evidence
suggests that current restrictions on unemployment insurance go well beyond
what is necessary to eliminate any inappropriate work disincentive. 284 Despite
that evidence, the able-and-available and voluntary-quit rules remain in
place, and they have serious consequences. 285 Workers who leave jobs for
fear of being infected with SARS-CoV-2, or who refuse to take particular
jobs because of the same concern, will often be disqualified by these
provisions.286
These rules thus reinforce the deadly dilemma for people who are
especially at risk of COVID-19 infection, work in a position that puts them
at risk, or lose any means of providing for basic necessities. Once again, the
fault/responsibility paradigm prevents employment law from adequately
cushioning the burdens of responding to a public health crisis. As with the
rules limiting access to workers’ compensation, the rules limiting access to
unemployment insurance may in fact be exacerbating employers’ moral
hazard of shifting costs to workers and society.

283. Lester, supra note 271, at 352. On how these rules aim at avoiding workers’ moral
hazard, see id. at 350–53.
284. See, e.g., Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, The Economic Case for
Strengthening Unemployment Insurance 7–8 (July 11, 2016) (transcript available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160711_furman_uireform
_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HW9-JXKK]) (describing the evidence).
285. Lester, supra note 271, at 352–55.
286. Indeed, a number of public officials have prominently encouraged this result. Iowa
Governor Kim Reynolds declared that “[i]f you’re an employer and you offer to bring your
employee back to work and they decide not to, that’s a voluntary quit.” Marty Johnson, States
Tell Workers They’ll Lose Unemployment Benefits if They Refuse To Return to Jobs, HILL (Apr.
28, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/495050-states-telling-workerstheyll-lose-unemployment-benefits-if-they-refuse [https://perma.cc/WBG6-PSNJ]. Reynolds has
urged employers to report to the state those workers who refuse to return. See id. Ohio has
encouraged the reporting of employees who do not come back to work when their businesses
reopen. See Lauren Aratani, Ohio Urges Employers To Report Workers Fearful of Returning to
Work,
GUARDIAN
(May
8,
2020,
7:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/08/ohio-coronavirus-reopening-workersunemployment-benefits [https://perma.cc/2B7T-55YC]. The Trump Administration has
supported these efforts, on the ground that they will “guard against fraud and abuse” of the
unemployment system. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Department of Labor Issues
Guidance and Reminders to States To Ensure Integrity of Unemployment Insurance Programs
(May
11,
2020),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20200511-1
[https://perma.cc/8ZVF-F3SS].
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b. Disability Insurance
There is a federal program, financed by payroll taxes, for individuals who
have left the workforce due to their health conditions—Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI). SSDI rolls tend to rise during severe economic
downturns, a result that might suggest that the program serves as a backup or
residual form of unemployment insurance.287 If SSDI took up the slack, the
limitations of the unemployment insurance program would not be as great a
problem.
Unfortunately, SSDI faces its own limitations. For one thing, the Social
Security Act provides that workers cannot qualify for the program unless they
can demonstrate that they have a severe impairment that makes them unable
to perform not only their past work but “any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy.” 288 The statute erects such a
demanding standard because of fears that without a high bar for qualifying as
disabled, people who are capable of work will use the program as an excuse
for going on the dole.289 Indeed, the SSDI program has remained under
persistent political threat precisely because of concerns that the statute’s bar
is not set high enough.290 Once again, the fault/responsibility paradigm—
instantiated as a worry about workers’ moral hazard—limits the effectiveness
of the law’s protection of vulnerable workers.
Many people who are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 will not satisfy
the standard for receiving SSDI benefits. After all, their problem is likely to
be a mismatch between their age or medical conditions and the jobs on offer
to them rather than an inability to work in any position in the national
economy. For those who can satisfy the disability standard, the process can
take months or even years291—hardly timely for those who have lost their

287. See Andreas I. Mueller, Jesse Rothstein & Till M. von Wachter, Unemployment
Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession, 34 J. LAB. ECON. S445, S446 (2016).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see also GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 281, at 72 (stating
that “the major determinant of disability claims is . . . the business cycle”).
289. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 413, 421–22 (2017).
290. See id. at 427–28.
291. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-01-261, MAJOR MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 18 (2001). (“SSA’s
complex disability claims process has been plagued by a number of long-standing weaknesses
that have resulted in lengthy waiting periods for claimants seeking disability benefits. For
example, claimants who are dissatisfied with the initial determination and file an appeal
frequently wait more than 1 year for a final decision.”). As of May 2019, the average processing
time was 520 days for a pending disability claim case. Improve Administration of the Disability
Programs, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.ssa.gov/audits-and-investigations/top-ssamanagement-issues/improve-administration-disability-programs [https://perma.cc/JP39-Q6YD].
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source of livelihood. SSDI thus cannot be counted on to protect workers
against the dilemma of choosing between their lives and their livelihood.
***
In all of these respects, legal rules protect employers against costs that we
think society ought to bear, but they then turn around and ensure that society
won’t bear those costs either. Low-wage workers, people of color, women,
and people with disabilities are left to fend for themselves. As we showed in
Part I, the consequences have been unjust and unequal. The next Part offers
some proposed solutions.
III.

CENTERING SOLIDARITY IN PANDEMIC PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

As we have shown, the personal responsibility strategy for mitigating the
coronavirus pandemic has been disastrously ineffective. And its benefits and
burdens have been allocated in deeply unjust ways. The result has been to
exacerbate social fragmentation rather than to foster the solidarity that should
drive pandemic response.
In this Part, we sketch the beginnings of an alternative, solidarity-focused
approach to pandemic prevention and response. The notion that the health of
those at greatest risk—and of the communities with which they are
interconnected—is left to the mercy of personal, rather than public,
responsibility is antithetical to a solidarity vision of public health. In
elaborating our argument, we draw on the theoretical work of public health
ethicists and legal scholars who have identified solidarity as a key goal. But
our main focus is on concrete legal and policy proposals.
A solidarity approach to pandemic response would support the ability of
all people to abide by public health recommendations (and thus to benefit
from the pandemic response) and would ensure the burdens of pandemic
response are equitably distributed. Supported isolation, quarantine, and social
distancing would require securing access to—and eliminating discrimination
in—housing, nutrition, education, and health care in the face of social,
economic, and cultural disruption.292 Our focus here is on employment, where
we identify two key areas for reform to ensure more effective and just
pandemic prevention and response. First, employment law should protect
workers from becoming infected and spreading infection to others. It should
292. See Emily A. Benfer, Seema Mohapatra, Ruqaiijah Yearby & Lindsay Wiley, Health
Justice Strategies To Combat the Pandemic: Eliminating Discrimination, Poverty, and Health
Disparities During and After COVID-19, 20 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS (forthcoming
2021) (on file with authors).
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do so through workplace safety, privacy, and antidiscrimination protections
that enable workers to adopt protective health behaviors. And for individuals
for whom returning to work would be especially unsafe—whether because
their employers maintain particularly dangerous conditions or because of
their own, or their family members’, underlying health conditions—
employment law should remove any obligation to return to work while the
special dangers associated with the pandemic persist.
A. Protect Workers
Workers who meet our basic needs during a crisis cannot be separated
from “the regular people.” Essential workers and their household members
work, live, learn, and worship in our communities. Protecting them is a moral
imperative. It is also a public health imperative. When essential workers
become infected—particularly if they don’t have access to testing and
supported isolation—they may spread infection to their household members
and others in their communities. As non-essential businesses and schools
have opened up, more and more workers are being asked to put themselves
in harm’s way.
1.

Safety Precautions

It is perhaps a banal point, but it deserves emphasis: Just because the
individual and societal benefits of working are understood to outweigh the
costs, that does not mean that costs are absent. Working during the
pandemic—particularly in jobs that require close congregation indoors for
long periods of time—poses a high risk of infection.293 That is why we have
seen so many outbreaks tied to congregate settings like nursing homes,
prisons, and meat processing plants.294 Those outbreaks eventually pose risks
to broader communities, but it is the workers in these settings who face them
most acutely.
Solidarity requires that society take steps to protect workers against those
risks. These workers are serving society as a whole—through specific
“essential” jobs, or through their contribution to the economic life of the
community—so society owes it to them to mitigate the harms they face. That
obligation has both short-term and long-term components.

293. See Mark Barnes & Paul E. Sax, Challenges of “Return to Work” in an Ongoing
Pandemic, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 779, 780 (2020).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 13–17.
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In the short term, the federal and state governments should require
employers to make their workplaces as safe from the risk of SARS-CoV-2
infection as is reasonably possible. This obligation should entail providing
personal protective equipment without requiring the workers to pay for it. It
also should entail protocols to require employers to act when a coronavirus
case is linked to their workplace—including notification of those who might
have been exposed and clearing the area in which transmission is likely to
have occurred until it can be adequately disinfected. OSHA could impose
these obligations as part of an emergency temporary standard. 295 If the agency
does not act, Congress should. Congressional action would have the added
benefit of potentially socializing the costs of these measures through federal
reimbursement of employers who face unusual burdens.
In the long term, the federal government needs to fully fund occupational
safety and health enforcement, so that employers can no longer violate the
OSH Act with relative impunity.296 As a backstop, Congress should give
workers a private right of action so that they may sue for violations of the
statute when OSHA fails to act. And Congress should add robust
whistleblower protections—including their own private right of action—to
the Act. During the pandemic, we have seen too many examples of workers
who have been fired for calling out risks on the job.297 Firings like these send
a powerfully threatening message to other potential whistleblowers—one that
bolsters employers’ impunity for health and safety violations. Currently,
though, employees who face retaliation for speaking out about workplace
risks are limited to an administrative remedy, one that leaves in the hands of
the Department of Labor the decision whether to sue—and one that the
worker must invoke within a punishing thirty-day limitations period. 298

295. See supra text accompanying notes 188–194 (discussing OSHA’s refusal, so far, to
adopt an emergency temporary standard in response to the pandemic).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 206–208 (discussing OSHA’s severe lack of
enforcement resources).
297. For just a small sample of stories, see Christine Fisher, US Senators Ask Amazon Why
It
Keeps
Firing
COVID-19
Whistleblowers,
ENGADGET
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.engadget.com/senators-question-amazon-covid-19-whistleblower-firings185144658.html [https://perma.cc/7N5M-JKW3]; Ron Judd, Backed by ACLU, Whistleblowing
Doctor Sues Bellingham Hospital After He Was Fired for Raising Coronavirus Concerns,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 28, 2020, 11:04 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/aclujoins-ousted-doctor-ming-lin-in-lawsuit-against-bellingham-hospital/ [https://perma.cc/J9EDT38C]; Sarah Rahal, Deaths in Hallways, Unrefrigerated Bodies: Fired Nurses Sue, Cite
COVID-19 Conditions at Sinai-Grace, DETROIT NEWS (June 11, 2020, 6:53 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/06/11/dmc-sinai-grace-detroithospital-nurses-covid-firing-whistleblowers/5341372002/ [https://perma.cc/94EY-K5HP].
298. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
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And the pandemic should lead us to rethink the geographic organization
of work. Experience born of necessity during stay-home orders has shown
that many more jobs can be effectively performed remotely than employers
had previously thought. 299 A post-COVID expansion of work-from-home
policies—aided by a significant governmental investment in high-speed
internet infrastructure to ensure that historically excluded communities are
not left behind300—would help avoid putting workers at needless risk in the
next pandemic.
The current crisis has also demonstrated that infectious diseases spread
rapidly in congregate residential facilities such as jails, prisons, nursing
homes, and psychiatric or developmental disability institutions. 301 The
imperatives to disrupt person-to-person transmission and protect residents
and staff from infection should give added weight to longstanding calls for
decarceration and deinstitutionalization.302 To the extent possible, we should
replace these congregate facilities with community-based services and
supports that enable people to live in their own homes. Doing so would
protect both residents and workers in a future pandemic.
2.

Antidiscrimination Rules, Privacy Protections, and Supports for
Those Who Should Stay Home

In the previous section, we spoke of the imperative to protect workers
generally. We did not draw any distinctions among employees at a given
workplace. But workers are not all relevantly the same. Those who are
infected by COVID-19 can pose risks to their susceptible coworkers. An
employer’s obligation to protect susceptible workers may thus require
imposing burdens on infected workers. Some susceptible employees may be
299. See, e.g., Olga Khazan, Work from Home Is Here To Stay, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/05/work-from-home-pandemic/611098/
[https://perma.cc/4CPY-TYVF]; Maria Cramer & Mihir Zaveri, What if You Don’t Want To Go
Back
to
the
Office?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
31,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/business/pandemic-work-from-home-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/2H92-AU6U]; Lisa Schur & Douglas L. Kruse, Coronavirus Could
Revolutionize Work Opportunities for People with Disabilities, CONVERSATION (May 5, 2020,
8:18 AM), https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-could-revolutionize-work-opportunities-forpeople-with-disabilities-137462 [https://perma.cc/27G9-NTPE].
300. See Carl Smith, COVID-19 and the Digital Divide, GOVERNING (June 5, 2020),
https://www.governing.com/next/Legislative-Watch-COVID-19-and-the-Digital-Divide.html
[https://perma.cc/C5SD-CUTN].
301. See supra text accompanying notes 13–17.
302. See
generally
LIAT
BEN-MOSHE,
DECARCERATING
DISABILITY:
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PRISON ABOLITION (2020); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and
Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012).
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older or have chronic conditions that would make them particularly
vulnerable to severe illness or death from COVID-19. Some workers don’t
have those conditions themselves, but they live with people who have them.
An employer might wish to exclude these particularly vulnerable employees
from the workplace. Or perhaps the employer might have heightened
obligations toward them. Either way, different workers will receive different
treatment.
Discrimination like this imposes burdens on some workers to protect
others. Our solidarity-focused approach demands that the burdens and
benefits be distributed fairly across these groups. There are three key
questions here: When may an employer exclude a worker for posing a risk to
others? What techniques may an employer use to determine which workers
to exclude? And what is the employer’s—or society’s—obligation to those
workers who must, or appropriately choose to, stay home? As we consider
these questions, we keep in mind the lessons of the HIV pandemic, in which
legal protections for privacy and against discrimination have been key tools
for supporting public health measures.303 Testing saves lives. Not necessarily
the lives of people who are tested, but the lives of people they might be able
to avoid infecting if they know their status. From the HIV experience, we
know that telling people to get tested isn’t enough.304 Testing also has to be
accessible, and people who get tested have to be confident they won’t face
serious social or economic repercussions if the test result is positive. 305
a. When May an Employer Exclude a Worker?
The ADA specifically permits employers to exclude workers who,
because of their disabilities, “pose a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace.”306 With the Supreme Court’s blessing,
the EEOC has extended that “direct threat” defense to cases in which a
worker’s employment will pose a significant risk to the worker him- or
herself.307 But the law sharply limits an employer’s discretion to exclude a
worker based on a direct threat. The statute and the regulations define “direct
threat” as a “significant risk” to health or safety “that cannot be eliminated
303. See Burris, supra note 41, at 855.
304. See John E. Anderson et al., HIV Antibody Testing and Posttest Counseling in the United
States: Data from the 1989 National Health Interview Survey, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1533, 1534
(1992) (estimating that less than half of those at high risk for contracting AIDS were tested).
305. See Burris, supra note 41, at 835–36 (arguing that individual rights to privacy and
nondiscrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations support HIV prevention
goals).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
307. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2019); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76
(2002).
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by reasonable accommodation.”308 The regulations and the case law require
that any direct-threat determination must “be based on an individualized
assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of the job,” which assessment itself must “be based on a reasonable
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or
on the best available objective evidence.” 309 In making that determination, the
Supreme Court has said “the views of public health authorities, such as the
U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are
of special weight and authority.”310
At least insofar as these rules permit employers to exclude workers who
pose significant risks to others,311 the “direct threat” doctrine under the ADA
largely comports with our solidarity approach. Solidarity requires protecting
workers against others who will likely harm them (so long as reciprocal
supports are provided to the workers who are excluded, as we discuss below).
Because employers may be driven by bias or conflicts of interest, it is
appropriate that they should be stringently regulated in making exclusion
decisions and, where possible, guided by the recommendations of public
health authorities regarding the period of infectiousness.312 And where
effective vaccines and treatments for a dangerous disease are not widely
available, as is currently the case for COVID-19, those who are infectious
would almost certainly pose a significant risk. 313
b. How May an Employer Identify Which Workers To Exclude?
This question raises more complex issues. The only way an employer can
reliably identify which workers pose a risk of transmission is to require
medical examinations or tests. But individuals have significant interests in

308. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2019) (defining “direct threat” as “a
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot
be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation”).
309. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see Chevron, 536 U.S. at 85–86.
310. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998).
311. For a critique of Chevron’s extension of the direct threat defense to include threats to
self, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923 (2004).
312. For a defense of the ADA’s deference to public health authorities in the direct threat
doctrine, see Bagenstos, supra note 187, at 1492–1503.
313. The EEOC has stated as much. See What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-actand-other-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/P8BR-4TWQ] (“An employer may exclude those with
COVID-19 . . . from the workplace because, as EEOC has stated, their presence would pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of others.”) (Sept. 8, 2020).
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keeping their health information private from their bosses. 314 Solidarity
requires accommodating those privacy interests with the health interests of
coworkers, vendors, customers, and the communities in which they live.
Once again, the ADA offers a framework consistent with our solidarity
approach. The statute prohibits employers from requiring incumbent
employees to submit to medical examinations or disability-based inquiries
“unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity.”315 EEOC regulations implementing the statute
require that any information obtained in such examinations “shall be
collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and
be treated as a confidential medical record,” with three narrow exceptions:
where a supervisor needs to know of necessary work restrictions or
accommodations, where it is “appropriate” for first responders to know of an
employee’s disability that “might require emergency treatment,” or where
government investigators ask for the information. 316
Given the current risks attendant to SARS-CoV-2 infection, an employer
could appropriately require periodic tests of its employees pursuant to these
provisions.317 It could also appropriately require workers to disclose their
exposure to people with known infection. 318 So long as the employer keeps
the information confidential—and so long as workers who test positive or
disclose their potential exposure are provided workplace accommodations or
out-of-work supports—such practices are consistent with solidarity. A
worker has obligations to others in society, just as society has correlative
obligations to the worker.
To recognize that an employer may require testing for its employees raises
additional questions, though. What, beyond excluding infected employees
314. For a normative defense of worker privacy protections, see Bagenstos, supra note 55, at
247–53.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
316. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (2019).
317. The EEOC has issued guidance stating that an employer may lawfully “administer
COVID-19 testing to employees before initially permitting them to enter the workplace and/or
periodically to determine if their presence in the workplace poses a direct threat to others,” so
long as the employer “ensure[s] that the tests are considered accurate and reliable.” U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 313.
318. On its face, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act appears to prohibit an
employer from requesting information about “the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family
members.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff(4)(A)(iii), 2000ff-1(a)(1). Courts have read this provision as
limited to cases in which the requested information involves diseases with a genetic or hereditary
component. See, e.g., Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, L.L.C., 852 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (W.D. Va.
2012). For a critique of Poore, which nonetheless agrees that the statute does not cover spousal
health information, see Mark A. Rothstein, Jessica Roberts & Tee L. Guidotti, Limiting
Occupational Medical Evaluations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 523, 557 (2015).
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from the workplace during the period in which they may transmit the disease,
may an employer do with the information disclosing that a worker has been
infected? The EEOC has said that it is consistent with general medical
confidentiality to report that information to public health authorities for
appropriate follow-up.319 Whether the employer may conduct its own contact
tracing within the workplace (beyond obvious steps like identifying and
informing anyone who works in the same location as an affected employee)
raises more difficult questions. Businesses are likely to have less expertise in
contact tracing than are public health authorities and the outside entities they
engage to perform that work. Workers may reasonably fear that disclosures
of contacts to company officials will not remain private or will be used for
purposes that go beyond protecting their coworkers’ health. And because
everyone has contacts with people both in and out of the workplace,
employer-conducted tracing efforts will necessarily overlap with (and thus
duplicate) the work that public health authorities and allied organizations are
already doing. It may thus make the most sense to leave contact tracing in the
hands of those authorities. Individuals who test positive for infection should
be required to cooperate with an appropriate contact tracing regime, however.
What about “immunity passports”?320 May an employer demand that
workers demonstrate immunity from a deadly infectious disease, by
providing either a positive antibody test or (when it becomes available) proof
of vaccination? Under the ADA at the moment, the answer is clear enough.
Although FDA has authorized COVID-19 vaccines for emergency use, they
are not yet widely available and manufacturers have not yet sought full FDA
approval through biologics license applications. 321 Though antibody tests are
available, they vary in their reliability—and it is not yet clear whether prior
infection confers future immunity, and if so, how strong or long-lasting that

319. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 313 (stating that an employer may
“disclose the name of an employee to a public health agency when it learns that the employee has
COVID-19”).
320. For a general discussion of the issues entailed by immunity passports, see Alexandra L.
Phelan, COVID-19 Immunity Passports and Vaccination Certificates: Scientific, Equitable, and
Legal Challenges, 395 LANCET 1595 (2020).
321. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Additional Action in Fight
Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for Second COVID-19 Vaccine
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-additionalaction-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-second-covid
[https://perma.cc/33AN-FSWC]; Kayla Rivas, Pfizer To Request COVID-19 Vaccine Full
Approval in ‘First Half of 2021,’ FOX NEWS, https://www.foxnews.com/health/pfizer-requestfull-approval-coronavirus-vaccine-first-half-2021-fda [https://perma.cc/RT5C-NCAK].
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immunity will be.322 Under these circumstances, the EEOC has determined
that antibody testing is not “job related and consistent with business
necessity” and is thus barred by the ADA.323
At some point, however, vaccines will become more widely available and
we may eventually develop a reliable test of acquired immunity. At that point,
the business-necessity calculus will change. Lack of immunity does not
present the same risk of transmission as an active infection. But workers in
high-risk settings—especially nursing home staff, home health workers, and
others whose work requires close contact with people who are particularly
vulnerable to COVID-19—may be subject to vaccination requirements as a
condition of employment. This requirement could come from state and local
governments or from employers themselves. Annual vaccination of healthcare workers for seasonal flu has been recommended—but not required—by
the CDC for decades.324 Some states require it, and many require at least some
vaccinations for at least some health workers. 325 These requirements are
already controversial.326 We expect any requirement to accept a new vaccine
that the Trump administration has touted as being developed at “warp speed”
to be even more so.327 For some, particularly Black Americans, vaccine

322. Robert H. Shmerling, Which Test Is Best for COVID-19?, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G:
HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:34 AM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/which-testis-best-for-covid-19-2020081020734 [https://perma.cc/YZ8B-QR2X].
323. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 313.
324. See, e.g., Vaccine Information for Adults: Healthcare Workers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/adults/rec-vac/hcw.html
[https://perma.cc/TV8Y-JYMU] (May 2, 2016).
325. See State Immunization Laws for Healthcare Workers and Patients, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www2a.cdc.gov/vaccines/statevaccsApp/AdministrationbyVaccine.asp?Vaccinetmp=Infl
uenza [https://perma.cc/DZB8-KUU9].
326. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, They Didn’t Get Vaccinated. Now They’re Out of Jobs, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/they-didn-t-getvaccinated-now-they-re-out-jobs-n823446 [https://perma.cc/CRR5-RBN3] (describing “a
growing trend for hospitals to require flu shots for workers,” accommodations offered by some
hospitals, and controversy surrounding the policies).
327. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Mistrust of a Coronavirus Vaccine Could Imperil Widespread
Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/health/coronavirusanti-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/A4EN-8N4Y]; Kashmira Gander, Third of Americans Say
They Won’t Get a COVID-19 Vaccine, with Black Americans the Most Skeptical, NEWSWEEK
(June 10, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/american-covid-19-vaccine-skeptical1509895 [https://perma.cc/AXJ2-2ZJK].
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hesitancy may be shaped by distrust fostered by a long history of racism and
unethical treatment at the hands of the public health establishment. 328
Before employers or public health authorities mandate vaccination, there
must be a credible, public demonstration of the efficacy, and the risk–benefit
balance, of a vaccine. Even then, the disability discrimination laws may
require accommodations for some workers for whom vaccination is unsafe.
The option of presenting an antibody test result could be one such
accommodation, depending on whether such results are eventually deemed
reliable. If reasonable accommodations are made, acceptance of vaccination
as a condition of working in a setting that poses a high risk of transmission
to others is part of what each of us owes our fellow members of the workplace
and community.
Absent a vaccine, a requirement of immunity passports would be much
more problematic. If the only way to acquire immunity without a vaccine is
to become infected with COVID-19 (or possibly with a similar virus), people
will have a strong incentive to expose themselves to the virus so that they can
receive the passport and go back to work. 329 That could have the perverse
effect of increasing the spread of infection. It will once again present a deadly
dilemma to those who, due to chronic conditions, face especially serious
harm if they get infected; run the risk of that harm in the hope of acquiring
immunity; or give up opportunities to earn a living. That dilemma will
328. See Olivia Lewis, Black, Hispanic Detroiters Hesitant To Take Coronavirus Vaccine,
BRIDGEDETROIT (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.bridgedetroit.com/black-hispanic-detroitershesitant-to-take-coronavirus-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/WN5Q-Z2FP]. One study found
[t]he clearest racial divide [among focus group participants] in vaccine
confidence was between White and African American participants’ different
levels of trust in the government’s role in vaccination. White participants
expressed greater trust in government, while African American participants
voiced lower trust, with particular concerns regarding the government’s
motives. . . . This distrust extended into conspiracy theories including beliefs
that the government was experimenting on minorities as ‘guinea pigs’, that the
vaccines were being diluted and distributed in Black communities, or that
vaccines were a form of population control. Additionally, the legacy of the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study emerged in every focus group as a justification for
distrust.
Sandra Quinn, Amelia Jamison, Donald Musa, Karen Hilyard & Vicki Freimuth, Exploring the
Continuum of Vaccine Hesitancy Between African American and White Adults: Results of a
Qualitative Study, PLOS CURRENTS OUTBREAKS (Dec. 29, 2016) (emphasis omitted),
https://currents.plos.org/outbreaks/article/exploring-the-continuum-of-vaccine-hesitancybetween-african-american-and-white-adults-results-of-a-qualitative-study/
[https://perma.cc/8KEW-X33V].
329. Daniel Hemel & Anup Malani, Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard 3 (U. Chi. Pub.
L., Working Paper No. 743, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3596569
[https://perma.cc/HB9L-H8BE].
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necessarily fall more heavily on disabled individuals as well as
“[c]ommunities of color, including Black, Latinx, and Indigenous
communities,” who “already face health disparities due to socioeconomic
barriers.”330 These considerations weigh against generally allowing
employers to rely on immunity passports, at least in the absence of a safe,
effective, and widely available vaccine.
What if a worker refuses to submit to legitimate workplace testing or,
absent a valid health excuse, refuses to be vaccinated? So long as those who
are infectious or are at especial risk receive appropriate support outside of the
workplace, we believe that employers should be permitted to exclude such
workers. To allow a worker to impose risks on others, without a sufficient
reason, is antithetical to the burden-sharing that is the essence of solidarity.
It is crucial piece of the bargain, however, that employers and the government
provide adequate support to those who cannot or should not work. That is the
issue to which we now turn.
c. What Is the Employer’s and the Government’s Obligation to Workers
Who Must or Should Stay Home?
As we have said, solidarity requires that some people stay home from work
when they are possibly infectious so that they do not impose risks on others.
Others should have the option to stay home because they are older or have
chronic conditions that will place them at high risk of serious harm if they
contract the virus. And still others should have the option to stay home
because they have caregiving obligations—to children whose schools are
closed by the pandemic, to family members who have themselves been
infected, et cetera. Solidarity imposes on society a correlative obligation to
cushion the blow for those individuals, who are sacrificing for the good of
other members of the community.
Where the need to stay home lasts for a relatively short amount of time,
job accommodations are an obvious response. If a person tests positive for
COVID-19, for example, but is not too sick to work, the employer should
endeavor to restructure their job or temporarily reassign them to a new
position that can be performed remotely. That accommodation should
continue until the worker is no longer infectious. Accommodations like these
are generally required by the ADA in any event. 331
Accommodations like these should also be the first option for those who
are older or who have chronic conditions that make them particularly
330. Esha Bhandari & ReNika Moore, Coronavirus ‘Immunity Passports’ Are Not the
Answer, ACLU (May 18, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/coronavirusimmunity-passports-are-not-the-answer/ [https://perma.cc/VV5T-EAGP].
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
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vulnerable to COVID-19. If the workplace remains unsafe for an individual
with such a condition for a sufficiently long time, however, the
accommodation will likely become an “undue hardship.”332
At that point, the accommodation will no longer be required by the ADA.
It would also be unfair to demand that the employer alone bear such a heavy
burden simply due to the fortuity that it happened to hire a worker with a preexisting health condition.333 And imposing that burden would give employers
an incentive to discriminate in hiring against workers with such conditions.
Where longer-term accommodations are required, then, the federal
government should socialize the costs for workers to take paid leaves of
absence. For the same reasons, workers who are too sick to work or who have
caretaking responsibilities should receive paid leave financed by a similar
program. And workers who are fired after refusing to report for assignments
that present special risks to them should no longer be deemed to have
“voluntarily” quit or to be not “available” for work in ways that disqualify
them from unemployment insurance. 334 People should be supported in staying
home in these circumstances, and the cost should be shared across society.
The solidarity approach would justify a broader array of universal
workplace protections that would extend beyond just the COVID-19
pandemic—or, indeed, any pandemic. Even outside of a pandemic situation,
guaranteed paid family care, medical, and sick leave would serve solidarity
interests. Our argument thus supports the longstanding proposals for a
federally funded paid leave program.335 And although the current pandemic
puts the pathologies of our current unemployment insurance system in
particularly bold relief, we cannot solve those pathologies by a narrow reform
limited to the current crisis. Rather, we should take the long-overdue step of

332. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
333. For an argument that the obligation to avoid contributing to a system of societal
subordination justifies requiring the employer to pay for “reasonable” accommodations that do
not work “undue hardship”—an argument that readily translates to this context—see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 869–70 (2003).
334. Some, but far from all, states allow workers to receive unemployment in these
circumstances. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, Californians Who Refuse Work Because of
Coronavirus May Still Get Unemployment Benefits, S.F. CHRON. (May 13, 2020, 6:39 PM)
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Californians-can-refuse-some-workduring-15267447.php [https://perma.cc/X37Y-5QAL].
335. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1
(2005); see also Catherine Albiston & Lindsey Trimble O’Connor, Just Leave, 39 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 1, 50 (2016) (“On the surface, paid family leave programs seem to solve work-family
conflict, but for some workers, especially those in precarious jobs, the choice to take paid family
leave may not be viable without broader legal protections.”).
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moving the unemployment insurance system to the federal government, so
that benefit levels are not subject to the interstate race to the bottom. 336
CONCLUSION
The coronavirus pandemic has been a test of our ability to respond to the
profound insights of social epidemiology. People’s health-related
behaviors—and the ways in which they encounter the agents of
communicable disease—are shaped by their social, economic, and
employment circumstances. Telling people to take personal responsibility for
avoiding infection without creating the conditions required for them to be
able to do so does not work.337 Moreover, it further exacerbates health
disparities and fragments our society. The personal responsibility ethos that
has driven the U.S. pandemic response has been ineffective, atomizing, and
unjust.
Interventions that place the onus on individuals to change their behavior
have been woefully inadequate to achieve community mitigation. Congress,
the federal administration, and governors have taken people’s socioeconomic
circumstances as a given, instead of adopting a community-responsibility
frame to address them directly through job protections and income support.
The results have been predictably disastrous. As Professor Daniel Goldberg
has said in response to the critique of new public health, “either the social
epidemiologists’ contention that socioeconomic disparities are a primary
factor in causing good public health is accurate, or it is not.”338
The COVID-19 pandemic has given us an answer. It doesn’t work to tell
people to change their behaviors—to stay home and keep their distance from
others when out and about—without changing the context so they can follow
public health recommendations without facing existential threats to their
employment and basic income. It doesn’t work to expect people to report for
duty in high-risk settings—factories, nursing homes, bars, restaurants,
classrooms—while putting the onus on them to provide their own personal
336. For previous proposals to federalize unemployment insurance, see STEPHEN A.
WANDNER, W.E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP. RSCH., OPTIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
STRUCTURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS (2020),
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=up_policypapers
[https://perma.cc/GHT3-VS73].
337. Cf. RICHARD WILSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 234 (2010) (“[I]nitiatives aimed at tackling health or social
problems . . . often seem to be based on the belief that the poor need to be taught to be more
sensible. The glaringly obvious fact that these problems have common roots in inequality and
relative deprivation disappears from view.”).
338. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 73.
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protective equipment and try to find a way to perform their job duties while
maintaining physical distance. Telling schoolteachers and students they can
pop outside to get some fresh air during scheduled breaks doesn’t cut it. As
Goldberg argues, “[I]f socioeconomic disparities are truly productive of
public health, policies consistent with the narrow model, which by definition
do nothing to ameliorate social conditions, will do little to actually improve
health in the aggregate.”339 And that is exactly the world we are living in right
now.
Moreover, attention to the factors that expose low-wage workers, people
with disabilities, immigrants, Black people, Indigenous people, Latinos, and
Latinas to greater health risks—infectious diseases and the chronic conditions
that have made them more vulnerable to COVID-19—cannot be reserved for
times of crisis. As Tong reflected following her pandemic planning
experience, “[W]hy is it that society creates task forces to meet all people’s,
but especially vulnerable people’s, needs during [a] pandemic or . . . natural
disaster, when that same society ignores and/or neglects meeting vulnerable
people’s needs in relatively good times?”340 Though moments of crisis create
the desire to come to each other’s mutual aid, that motivation is impotent if
it doesn’t lead to action. Mutual aid efforts within communities have been
powerful but limited in their reach. Employment and antidiscrimination law
reforms grounded in solidarity are overdue.
“[T]aking solidarity seriously,” as Professors Angus Dawson and Bruce
Jennings have urged public health ethics must, “allows us to see . . . the
distribution of health and disease as being of joint and common concern.” 341
The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated the deeply interdependent
nature of individual and public health. But thus far, the U.S. response has
further atomized our society rather than fostered deeper connections between
individuals and their communities. This crisis may be a preview of even more
existential threats to come within a generation. As with COVID-19 (which is
caused by a zoonotic virus sensitive to environmental changes) 342, “health
threats associated with climate change are likely to exacerbate underlying
health disparities,” particularly for “the poor, city-dwellers, the elderly, and

339. Id. at 75.
340. Tong, supra note 110, at 226.
341. Dawson & Jennings, supra note 9, at 77.
342. John S. Mackenzie & David W. Smith, COVID-19—A Novel Zoonotic Disease: A
Review of the Disease, the Virus, and Public Health Measures, 32 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 145,
146 (2020); Sindy SanJuan-Reyes et al., COVID-19 in the Environment, CHEMOSPHERE, Aug. 14,
2020, at 6.
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those who suffer from chronic health conditions.”343 Like the coronavirus
pandemic, “climate change adaptation will raise issues of health equity and
put pressure on the traditional divide between public and private
responsibility for health.”344 Centering solidarity—including in employment
and antidiscrimination law—to respond to this pandemic may help build
social resilience to cope with future threats. By contrast, treating pandemic
prevention and response as a matter of personal responsibility could leave our
society fragmented and ill prepared for future crises.
The new public health law—built on a social-ecological model that
elucidates how people interact with each other and the agents of disease and
injury within social, economic, and physical environments—is not only
tenable but essential. Addressing the social determinants of health does not
put the coherence of public health law as a field at risk. Concerns about
politicizing public health law by eroding its supposed scientific neutrality
miss the fact that public health law is unavoidably political.345 “Public health
has always been politically controversial. And public health law—which
concerns the extent of government authority to intervene to protect the
public’s health—lives in the thick of this controversy.” 346 Our collaboration
demonstrates the power of placing public health principles at the center of
legal frameworks that govern “non-health” sectors and placing social
solidarity at the center of public health.
The deeply unjust distribution of the burdens and benefits of our response
to the coronavirus pandemic is no accident. It is shaped by social and
economic policies that have determined the health and wellbeing of
individuals and communities for generations. Our laws—including public
health, employment, and antidiscrimination laws—center personal
responsibility and blame in ways that contribute to and exacerbate economic
injustice and structural racism rather than prevent and ameliorate harm. Law
itself is a social determinant of health and wellbeing. It has brought us where
we are today and, for better or worse, it will take us where we’re going next.

343. Lindsay F. Wiley, Adaptation to the Health Consequences of Climate Change as a
Potential Influence on Public Health Law and Policy: From Preparedness to Resilience, 15
WIDENER L. REV. 483, 486 (2010).
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345. Daniel S. Goldberg, Against the Very Idea of the Politicization of Public Health Policy,
102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 44, 44 (2012).
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